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Abstract
This paper examines the effects of improvement in creditors’ rights protection on firms’
financing choices and securities issuance. To address these issues, I exploit exogenous variation
in creditors’ rights protection induced by the staggered adoption of anti-recharacterization laws
by some U.S. states. The laws enhance the ability of creditors to repossess collateral during
bankruptcy. Using a difference-in-difference methodology to estimate the causal impacts, I find
that: [1] the laws are positively related to debt capacity and debt maturity. Firms increase
market leverage and substitute away from costly short-term debt financing into long-term
debt financing [2] the laws are positively related to debt issuance [3] the laws are negatively
related to equity issuance. My analysis further demonstrates that proactive securities issuers
are significantly more responsive to the adoption of anti-recharacterization laws than passive
securities issuers.
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1 Introduction
A considerable body of literature has explored the effects of stronger creditors’ rights
protection on firms’ financing decisions. Most of the extant literature focuses on
institutions, legal origins and cross-country settings to study the impact of creditors’ rights
protection on external financing. The results are generally inconsistent. Some papers find
that stronger creditors’ rights are associated with reduction in information asymmetry and
increase in lending activities; while others find that due to costly asset liquidation in
default, stronger creditors’ rights discourage the use of secured debt financing1. While the
cross-country setting provides a granular understanding of the effects of stronger creditors’
rights protection on financing decisions, it nevertheless suffers from the fact that
cross-country differentials in both the type of creditors’ rights protection and the type of
enforcement mechanism are significant enough to generate contrasting results2.
In this paper, I exploit a plausibly within-country exogenous variation in creditors’ rights
protection; namely the staggered adoption of anti-recharacterization laws by some U.S states.
Under the U.S bankruptcy code 11 (“Chapter 11”- henceforth), the automatic stay clause
gives discretionary rights to courts to identify collateral as either loans or true sales, and to
declare the bankrupt firm as “debtor in possession”. Essentially, the automatic stay clause
requires that once a firm files for bankruptcy, the courts should grant and empower the
firm to have control rights over pledgeable assets. The bankrupt firm then retains its assets
and possessions while undergoing reorganization. As a result, creditors are unable to seize
1See La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), Djankov et al., (2007), Galindo and Micco, (2005), Acharya and
Subramanian, (2009), Acharya, Shin and Yorulmazer,(2011), Ghoul et al, (2012), Vig, (2013), Pistor, (2005).
2Countries differ in collateral limitations, bankrutpcy exemptions, discharge provisions, credit regulations,
political values, statutory responses and corruption levels. These factors significantly affect the credibility
and enforceability of laws especially in under developed and emerging markets.
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collateral until the bankrupt firm has fully undergone liquidation or restructuring. This
delay in creditors ability to recoup collateral results in uncertainty regarding the eventual
value of claims and widens the misalignment in incentives between creditors and borrowers.
Following significant lobbying activities by the banking and securitization industries,
seven U.S. states adopted anti-recharacterization laws (Kettering, 2008). These adoptions
took place between 1997 and 2005. The seven states that adopted the laws are: Alabama
(2001), Delaware (2002), Louisiana (1997), Nevada (2005), South Dakota (2003), Texas
(1997) and Virginia (2004). These new laws enhanced the ability of creditors to repossess
collateral during bankruptcy within these seven jurisdictions. In particular, under
anti-recharacterization laws, firms first transfer collateral into special purpose vehicles
(SPVs). These SPVs are generally low risk and tend to remain solvent reducing
uncertainty regarding the value of collateral- even when the firm in question is undergoing
restructuring. Additionally, under these new laws, the courts can no longer re-characterize
true sales as loans. Thus, anti-recharacterization laws protect creditors from automatic
stay and allow creditors to swiftly seize collateral or pledgeable assets from SPVs if a firm
files for bankruptcy. As such, the states’ staggered introduction of anti-recharacterization
laws serves as a quasi-natural experiment since the laws improve access to external
financing independent of firms’ growth opportunities, and facilitate the pledgeability of
assets for firms incorporated in these seven states (Mann 2017 ,Chu 2018, Favara, Gao and
Giannetti 2018, Li, Whited and Wu 2016). The passage of anti-recharacterization laws,
therefore, provides a setting to not only investigate how firms respond to exogenous shocks
in access to external financing but to also establish the causal effects of these responses. To
this effect, I hypothesize and test the following conjectures: [1] Anti-recharacterization laws
are associated with increase in debt capacity; [2] Anti-recharacterization laws are
associated with increase in debt issuance; [3] Anti-recharacterization laws are associated
with decline in equity issuance. Using a difference-in-differences methodology to estimate
the causal impacts, I find strong evidence in support of these three conjectures.
Firstly, I examine the effects of stronger creditors’ rights protection on firms’ access
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to external financing. Anti-recharacterization laws enhance creditors’ rights by facilitating
swift seizure of collateral, and by reducing uncertainty regarding the value of pledgeable
assets during bankruptcy. As such, following the passage of the laws, we would expect that
creditors would be more willing to extend debt financing, which would lead to an increase
in firms’ debt capacity. Consistent with this hypothesis, I find that the adoption of anti-
recharacterization laws is positively related to market leverage. Interestingly, I also find that
anti-recharacterization laws affect debt maturity. Firms on average increase the proportion
of long-term debt and reduce the proportion of short-term debt in their capital structure.
This is because the enhanced ability of creditors to repossess collateral during bankruptcy
minimizes information asymmetry and reduces uncertainty regarding the value of collateral.
Hence, creditors are more willing to provide long-term debt financing. Firms rebalance the
composition of debt structure; that is, firms substitute away from costly short-term debt
financing towards long-term debt financing. The results establish that the adoption of anti-
recharacterization laws is not only positively associated with an increase in debt capacity
but also affects firms’ debt structure.
Second, I examine whether the staggered introduction of anti-recharacterization laws
affects securities issuance and financing choices of firms incorporated in adopting states3.
There are several reasons why improvement in creditors’ rights protection may affects firms’
securities issuance. Under the trade-off theory, capital structure is a result of firms trading
off various costs and benefits. Such costs include bankruptcy costs and transaction costs.
The strengthening of creditors’ rights minimizes transaction costs and reduces uncertainty
associated with the value of underlying collateral during bankruptcy. Both of these effects
lead to increase in debt capacity and increase in lending activities. The key idea here is
that since anti-recharacterization laws lead to exogenous increase in leverage, we would
expect that the laws are positively related to debt issuance. My results largely support this
hypothesis. I also find that this result is mostly driven by firms that proactively issue debt.
A firm is classified as a proactive debt issuer if its total debt issuance in a given year is at
3Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001) find that security issuance is generally a function of deviation from
target leverage. Their results imply that increase in debt capacity has implications for securities issuance.
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least 5% of book value of assets. Proactive issuers tend to have higher needs for external
financing and are therefore more likely to take advantage of the increase in access to debt
financing following the adoption of anti-recharacterization laws.
My analysis also indicates that firms incorporated in states that have adopted anti-
recharacterization laws reduce equity issuance. A firm’s decision to issue equity is generally
perceived as a sign of overvaluation (Myers and Majluf, 1984) and on average results in
stock price decline (Asquith and Mullins, 1986, Loughran and Ritter, 1995). The exogenous
increase in debt capacity following the adoption of anti-recharacterization laws implies that
firms are more likely to reduce equity issuance. This is partly because even a small variance in
the costs of issuing equity versus issuing debt can generate significant utilization of debt over
equity (Almeida and Campello, 2007). Anti-recharacterization laws significantly increase the
probability of creditors repossessing collateral in adopting states during bankruptcy or during
financial distress, which reduces the uncertainty regarding the value of collateralized assets
and leads to increase in debt capacity. Consistent with this hypothesis, I find that firms
reduce equity issuance following the adoption of anti-recharacterization laws. Interestingly,
I also find that the documented reduction in equity issuance is mostly driven by frequent or
proactive equity issuers. Proactive equity issuers tend to face higher reduction in firm value4
and are therefore more likely to opportunitiscally reduce equity issuance when faced with
increased debt capacity and improved access to external financing. Additionally, I also find
that firms incorporated in adopting states also increase stock repurchases.
These findings are robust to a number of concerns. The first concern is that the results
may be due to confounding effects. To address this concern, I conduct a placebo test; that
is, I use a randomized matched subsample in which the documented treatment effects are
expected not to be observed. I find that the observed treatment effects of
anti-recharacterization laws on firms’ financing choices and securities issuance decisions are
not observed in the placebo group. I also find that the results are consistent and stronger
4Billet, Flannery and Garfinkel (2011): “We find that multiple patterns generate much worse performance
than single events...underperformance is more a function of the variety and frequency of firms’ issuance
activities”.
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when we only examine the three states that adopted anti-recharacterization laws before
2003, prior to the first legal challenge. Additional robustness tests include: [1]
Demonstrating that the results are robust to accounting for the effects of the 2008 financial
crisis, [2] Demonstrating that the results are consistent and more pronounced amongst
financial constrained firms, [3] Demonstrating that the results are consistent when
accounting for the availability of internal funds, [4] Demonstrating that the results are not
due to mechanical balance sheet expansion or growth in firm level covariates.
This paper contributes to several strands of existing literature. First, I contribute to
the emerging and ongoing literature on the effects of anti-recharacterization laws on firms’
performance. Mann (2017) examines the role of anti-recharacterization laws in the context
of patents and innovation and documents a positive relationship. Chu (2018) finds that anti-
recharacterization laws reduce corporate leasing and that this result is mostly concentrated
amongst financially constrained firms. Favara, Gao and Giannetti (2018) find that anti-
recharacterization laws mitigate the effects of uncertainty on firms’ behavior. Li, Whited and
Wu (2016) find that anti-recharacterization laws enhances financial flexibility. And Ersahin
(2018) finds that anti-recharacterization laws are positively related to firm productivity.
However, none of these papers examine the effects of anti-recharacterization laws on firms’
debt structure and securities issuance. In particular, external financing is costly and the
adoption of laws that strengthen creditors’ rights minimizes information asymmetry and
directly impacts securities issuance decisions. I first document that following the adoption of
anti-recharacterization laws, firms increase debt capacity. Specifically, firms in the adopting
states increase total market leverage, reduce short-term debt financing and increase the
fraction of long-term debt in their capital structure. I then present evidence to the effect
that the documented increase in debt capacity has profound implications for firms’ financing
activities. In particular, I find that firms incorporated in the adopting states not only increase
market leverage but also significantly increase debt issuance and significantly decrease equity
issuance.
Second, I contribute to the literature that examines the effects of stronger creditors’
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rights protection on firms’ performance. Central to this literature is the argument that
credit would not be extended if there were no credible legal enforcement mechanisms. The
legal enforcement mechanism under consideration in this paper is the ability of creditors
to repossess collateral during default or bankruptcy. The extant literature in this area
has documented contrasting results. For instance, Vig (2013) examines the effects of the
passage of a law in India that enhances creditors’ ability to repossess collateral and finds
reduction in the overall leverage and secured debt financing. Liu et al. (2018) examine the
passage of the first property rights laws in China and find that firms reduce leverage. Coco
(2000) presents a model in which collateral mitigates information asymmetry and enhances
extension of credit. And find that when the threat to repossess collateral during default is
credible, it aligns borrowers and lenders incentives and facilitate lending activities. Eisfeldt
and Rampini (2013) present a model in which both leasing and collateral affects capital
structure. La Porta et al (1997, 1998)5 and Galindo and Micco (2001) show that stronger
creditors’ rights protection affects financial market development and encourages extension
of credit to risky and smaller firms. My results largely support the notion that stronger
creditors’ rights protection facilitates lending activities and results in more efficient capital
markets. These results stand in contrast to the negative relation between stronger creditors
rights and leverage documented in Vig (2013) and Liu et al. (2018), whose sample consists
of Indian firms and Chinese firms respectively.
Third, I contribute to the literature on securities issuance. McKeon (2012), Denis and
McKeon (2012) find that firms decrease large equity issuance following increase in access
to debt financing. Frank and Goyal (2015) study the effects of profitability on changes
in equity due to active securities issuances and repurchases of securities. And find that
proactive issuers tend to reduce equity issuance following increase in profitability. Billet,
Flannery and Garfinkel (2011), and Ritter and Huang (2018) find that the frequency and
recency of security issuance results in lower long-run abnormal returns. DeAngelo, DeAngelo
5La Porta et al. (1998)“..creditors are paid because they have the right to repossess collateral. Without
these rights, investors would not be paid, and therefore firms would not have the benefit of raising funds
from investors...”
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and Whited (2011) find that financial flexibility, that is unused debt capacity, plays a key
role in capital structure dynamics. Note that none of these papers explicitly examine the
effects of stronger creditors’ rights protection on securities issuance decisions. However, my
results are generally consistent with the overarching themes and findings in the securities
issuance literature. To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to study the effects
of anti-recharacterization laws on debt maturity and firms’ securities issuance decisions. In
particular, I find that improvement in creditors’ rights protection can partially resolve the
puzzling observation that firms tend to reduce equity issuance after exogenous shock in their
debt capacity6. I also find that firms reduce equity issuance and increase debt issuance
following the adoption of anti-recharacterization laws.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section [2] presents firm-level data and
institutional details on anti-recharacterization laws. Section [3] describes the identification
strategy. Section [4] analyzes the relationship between the adoption of anti-recharacterization
laws, debt capacity, external financing and securities issuance. Section [5] presents a battery
of robustness tests. Section [6] concludes.
2 Data
2.1 Firm-Level Data
The sample consists of all U.S incorporated firms with total assets greater than $10Million
between 1990 and 2012. All data are extracted from the Compustat database, North America
Fundamentals Annual file. I exclude financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) since it is difficult to
assess their liquidity levels. I also exclude utilities (SIC 4900-4999) since their operations
are subjected to government regulations. For a firm to be included in Compustat, I require
that the state of incorporation be available in Compustat.
Table [1] presents the summary statistics of all relevant financial variables. The reported
statistics are: mean, median, standard deviation, 25th and 75th per centile respectively.
6See Denis and Mckeon (2012) fo discussion of this puzzle within the context of trade-off models
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Selection of firm-level controls is similar to Frank and Goyal (2009, 2015) and Favara, Gao
and Giannetti (2018). Leverage is estimated as the sum of long-term debt (DLTT) and debt
in current liabilities (DLC) scaled by total assets. The average leverage is about 0.23 while
the 25th per centile of the leverage distributon is about 0.0175 and the 75th per centile is
about 0.37. Net leverage is estimated as leverage net of cash, where cash is estimated as cash
and short-term investment (CHE) scaled by total assets. Cash has a mean and a median of
20% and 9.5% respectively. To be consistent with prior literature, size is estimated as the
natural logarithms of total sales. Note that in the data, the correlation between total sales
and total assets is about 90%, implying that sales is a robust proxy for firm size. Profits
are estimated as operating income before ordinary expense (OIBDP) scaled by total assets,
while tangibility is estimated as the property, plant and equipment (PPENT) scaled by total
assets and averages around 27%.
Market-to-book (MB) ratio is estimated as the ratio of total market value of assets to
book value of assets. Market value of assets is estimated as the sum of total assets and
market value of equity less ordinary equity. The average MB is about 2.30. Debt issuance
is estimated as issuance of long-term debt (dltis) plus increase in current debt (dlcch). The
average debt issue as a percent of total assets is about 7%. Equity issuance is estimated as
sale of common stock (prstkc) scaled by total assets. And the average equity issue is 12% of
total assets . Investment is capx scaled by total assets. The dividend dummy equals to “1”
if a firm pays dividend in that fiscal year, otherwise it equals to zero.
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
2.2 Institutional Background:
The Staggered Adoption of Anti-Recharacterization Laws
The availability of collateral is perhaps the most important determinant of access to
external financing. Collateral reduces information asymmetry and aligns incentives
between borrowers and creditors. In order to credibly signal availability of collateral, firms
9
can first transfer collateral or pledged assets to special purpose vehicles (SPVs)7. The main
advantage of using SPVs is that they remain solvent even during bankruptcy or financial
distress. This is because SPVs tend to have limited exposure to risk; as such pledgeable
assets retain value over time.
However, through the automatic stay clause the courts have the ultimate discretionary
rights to re-characterize assets in SPVs as either loans or true sales. That is, before the
state adoption of anti-recharacterization laws, the automatic stay clause in the bankrupcy
code (Chapter 11) implies that creditors are constrained in their capacity to repossess
collateral. The motivation behind the adoption of anti-recharacterization laws is that by
ensuring true sales are characterized as such, the laws effectively transfer some control
rights from borrowers to creditors. Creditors are thus able to seize pledged assets in case
the firm files for Chapter 11. Hence, anti-recharacterization laws effectively shield creditors
from automatic stay.
The passage of anti-recharacterization laws also strengthens creditors rights by both
minimizing the uncertainty associated with collateral value, and by treating collateral in
SPVs as true sales if labelled as such. The laws came to fruition as a result of intense
lobbying from the banking and securitization industries (Kettering, 2008). As a result of
these lobbying activities, seven U.S states passed laws specifically mandating that collateral
transfers to special purpose vehicles (SPVs) be treated as true sales if they are labelled as
such. The seven states that adopted anti-recharacterization laws are: Texas and Louisiana
in 1997, Alabama in 2001, Delaware in 2002, South Dakota in 2003, Virginia in 2004, and
Nevada in 2005.
The fact that it was the lobbying efforts by the banking and securitization industries
that led to the drafting and introduction of anti-recharacterization laws makes the
adoption of these laws plausibly exogenous. Hence, the staggered introduction of
anti-recharacterization laws serves as a quasi-natural experiment to evaluate firms’
response to this exogenous increase in access to external financing. The laws effectively
7See Feng, Gramlich and Gupta (2009), Gorton and Souleles (2007) for detailed discussion on use of
special purpose vehicles(SPVs)
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strengthened creditors’ rights by: [1] Facilitating swift seizure and repossession of assets
from SPVs, [2] Limiting applicability of automatic stays and [3] Reducing uncertainty
regarding the value of collaterized assets. Overall, anti-recharacterization laws reduce the
wedge and misalignment in incentives between creditors and borrowers. As such, we would
expect that improvement in creditors’ ability to repossess collateral or pledgeable assets
during bankruptcy or financial distress would be positively related to debt capacity.
3 Empirical Design and Identification Strategy
This paper examines the effects of anti-recharacterization laws on firms’ debt capacity,
external financing and securities issuance. The main objective is to examine how
improvement in creditors’ rights protection affects firms’ financing choices. The null
hypotheses aim to address the following questions for firms incorporated in the adopting
states: [1] What are the effects of anti-recharacterization laws on firms’ debt capacity and
debt structure, [2] What are the effects of anti-recharacterization laws on firms’ securities
issuance decisions {that is the choice between debt and equity financing}? My regression
analysis shows that after the adoption of anti-recharacterization laws, firms incorporated in
the adopting states increase total market leverage, decrease short-term debt financing and
increase the fraction of long-term debt in their capital structure. These firms also reduce
equity issuance and increase debt issuance.
To test the above hypotheses, my identification strategy compares firms’ financing
choices and securities issuance in adopting states with financing choices and securities
issuance of firms incorporated in non-adopting states, before and after the adoption of
anti-recharacterization laws. I start by estimating the following difference-in-difference
panel regression model8:
yi,s,t = αi + β1Lawi,s,t +X
′
itψ + ηi + δt + ǫit (1)
8A similar approach is applied in Mann, 2017, Favara, Gao and Giannetti, 2018, Li, Whited and Wu,
2016.
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where yi,s,t is an outcome of firm “i” incorporated in state “s” during year “t”. Xit is
a vector of firm-level variables that are highly correlated with leverage.“Law” is a dummy
variable equal to “1” if a firm is “treated”, that is if a firm is incorporated in state “s” that
has adopted anti-recharacterization laws at time “t”. Because of the staggered introduction
of the anti-recharacterization laws, the dummy “Law” takes the value of “1”: if a firm is
incorporated in either Texas or Louisiana after 1997, if a firm is incorporated in Alabama
after 2001, if a firm is incorporated in Delaware after 2002, if a firm is incorporated in
South Dakota after 2003, if a firm is incorporated in Virginia after 2004, and if a firm is
incorporated in Nevada after 2005. A firm is “treated” if it is incorporated in state “s” that
has adopted the anti-recharacterization laws at time “t”. All standard errors are clustered
at firm-level. ηi is the firm fixed effects, δt is time fixed effects and ǫit is the error term. And
αi is a vector capturing firm-specific intercepts.
As outlined above, the main goal of this paper is to study the effects of stronger
creditors’ rights protection on financing choices, firms’ debt capacity and securities
issuance. To this effect, I exploit the exogenous variation in creditors’ rights protection
induced by the staggered introduction of anti-recharacterization laws by some U.S states. I
start by examining the effects of anti-recharacterization laws on firms’ debt capacity. My
primary proxy for debt capacity is market leverage; the advantage of using this measure of
leverage is that it is generally forward-looking and therefore takes into account the
exogenous increase in debt capacity. Consistent with Denis and McKeon (2012), market
leverage is estimated as9:
MarketLeverageit =
DLTTit +DLCit
DLTTit +DLCit +MVE
,
st.MV E = PRCCitXCSHOit
(2)
Where DLC is debt in current liabilities including the portion of long-term debt due within
one year, and DLTT is the amount of long-term debt. MVE is the market value of equity
9Barclay, Morellec, and Smith (2006) present evidence that book-leverage is backward looking while
market leverage is forward looking
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estimated as the product of year-end common shares outstanding (CSHO) and year-end
common share stock price (PRCC−F). The estimated mean and median of market leverage
are about 21% and 12% respectively. The distribution of market leverage ranges from about
1% in the 25th per centile to about 35% in the 75th per centile10.
Figure [1] presents the time series evolution of mean market leverage over the sample
period. Observe that the first vertical reference line represents the initial introduction of anti-
recharacterization laws in Texas and Louisiana in 1997, and the second vertical reference line
represents the introduction of the laws in Nevada in 2005. Figure [1] demonstrates that the
average market leverage of “treated group” (solid line) is higher than for the “control group”
(long dash line). The figure suggests that increase in market leverage following adoption
of anti-recharacterization laws is evidence of the exogenous increase in debt capacity and
access to external financing. The graphical evidence supports the hypothesis that anti-
recharacterization laws reduce uncertainty surrounding the value of collaterized assets and
thus lead to an increase firms’ debt capacity. Notice also that for the pre-adoption period,
there is no discernible difference between “treated” firms and “control” firms. This result
is crucial as it satisfies the common or parallel trend assumption in difference-in-difference
setting. That is, mean market leverage for adopting states (treatment firms) and non-
adopting states (control firms) would follow the same time trend in the absence of anti-
recharacterization laws. Overall, Figure [1] suggests that there is no difference between the
“Treated” firms and “Control” firms prior to the introduction of the laws. As such Figure
[1] suggests that the adoption of anti-recharacterization laws is associated with increase in
debt capacity.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
10Distribution of leverage is consistent with the observation that about 10% of U.S. firms in Compustat
universe have zero debt-Strebulaev and Yang, 2013.
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4 Empirical Results
4.1 Anti-recharacterization Laws, Debt Capacity and Debt Policy
4.1.1 Identifying the Effects of Laws Adoption on Market Leverage
To examine the effects of anti-recharacterization laws on firms’ financing choices and debt
capacity, I estimate the reduced form difference-in-difference regression outlined in Equation
[1] above. Selection of independent variables (X), is motivated by prior literature (Lemmon,
Roberts and Zender, 2008, Frank and Goyal, 2009). The variables that extant literature
has documented as highly correlated to leverage include: size, profitability, tangibility and
market-to-book ratio. All variables are constructed as defined in section 2.1 above. Following
Petersen (2009), all standard errors in Equation [1] are clustered at firm-level.
Table [2A] presents the regression estimates from Equation [1] above. Models [1,2] present
panel regression estimates in which market leverage is the firm’s outcome variable of interest
and the anti-recharactization laws dummy is the sole independent variable. Market leverage
is estimated as in Equation [2] above. The coefficient of the dummy variable “Law” is
positive and statistically significant at 1% level. The result suggests that “treated” firms
significantly increase market leverage following state adoption of anti-recharacterization laws.
The results support the notion that anti-recharacterization laws, by minimizing information
asymmetry and reducing uncertainty regarding the value of collateralized assets, result in
increase in debt capacity. Additionally, anti-recharacterization laws also reduce demand for
insurance (Favara, Gao and Gianneti, 2018), since these laws enhance the ability of creditors
to repossess collateral or pledgeable assets during bankruptcy.
Models [3,4] control for firm-specific factors that are highly correlated with the firm’s
leverage decision. Observe that even after controlling for these factors, the estimated
coefficient of the dummy variable “Law” is positive and statistically significant across all
models. Economically, the adoption of anti-recharacterization laws is associated with an
increase of 6.05% over mean market leverage. The estimated coefficients of firm-specific
factors are generally consistent with those reported in prior literature (Rajan and Zingales,
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1995). Profitability is negatively related to market leverage. The result is consistent with
the notion that highly profitable firms find it less desirable to issue debt since such
additional debt tends to finance dividend issues rather than to increase equity (Hennessy
and Whited, 2005). Tangibility is positively related to market leverage. This is because
tangibility is a proxy for collateral, which minimize information asymmetry between
creditors and lenders. Tangibility also minimizes agency costs associated with risk shifting.
Firms with large a collateral base tend to be more valuable during financial distress and
liquidation. Creditors are more willing to supply loans and extend additional credit to
firms with a large collateral base. Additionally, firms that tend to have greater leverage
tend to employ a higher proportion of secured debt financing in their capital structure
(Giambona, Mello and Riddiough, 2012).
Size is positively related to market leverage11. Large firms tend be more diversified; as
such, firm size serves as an inverse proxy for bankruptcy. Large firms also tend to have easier
access to external financing than smaller firms (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994). Large firms
are also more active in issuing debt (Frank and Goyal, 2015) and are more likely to finance
projects with funds raised in capital markets (Bougheas et al., 2006). On the other hand,
small firms tend to borrow significantly from banks since the market perceives such firms
to be generally opaque and risky. In general, small firms tend to have a restricted access to
public debt and are constrained in their ability to issue debt securities. Note also that large
debt issues by small firms might significantly increase the probability of financial distress. As
a result, small firms tend to be highly sensitive to securities issuance costs. Market-to-book
ratio is an indicator of whether a firm is a value firm. Growth firms tend to have significantly
greater market value than book value,that is, higher MB. The estimated coefficient of MB
is negative but not robust.
In models [5,6] balance sheet leverage is the dependent variable12. Balance sheet leverage
11“Large firms ....have easier access to public debt markets and face fewer obstacles in accessing securities
markets”. Frank and Goyal (2015).
12Welch (2010) argues that balance sheet leverage is a robust measure as it predicts more leverage when
either the firm’s financial or non-financial liabilities are higher, and that unlike financial debt to asset ratio,
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is estimated as total liabilities scaled by total assets. The coefficient estimates of firm factors
are generally consistent with those reported in models [1-4], but my results in models [5,6]
are more subtle than those reported in Li, Whited and Wu (2016). Interestingly, the MB
coefficient is positive, a result which is consistent with the notion that growth firms tend to
have higher leverage relative to value firms.
Note that due to the right-skewed nature of leverage distribution13, the coefficient
estimates reported in Table 2[A] might be estimating conditional mean. That is, not only
is the underlying distribution affecting the coefficient estimates, but factors such as
asymmetries and sample selection might bias the estimates and lead to misinterpretation of
the source(s) of identification (Frank and Goyal, 2015). In order to minimize this bias, I
re-estimate the difference-in-difference regression model {Equation [1]} using quantile
regression analysis14. The advantage of using quantile regression analysis is that it takes
into account data distributional features other than the mean. In addition, quantile
regression estimators tend to be consistent under weaker stochastic assumptions than
estimates from using least squares estimation (Manski 1975, Powell 1984).
Model [1] of Table 2[B] replicates model [4] of Table 2[A]. Models [2,3,4] report estimates
for 25th, 50th and 75th per centile respectively. The results from the quantile regressions show
the marginal effect of anti-recharacterization laws on market leverage conditional on various
points in the distribution. The results are generally consistent with the estimates reported in
Table 2[A]. The coefficient estimates for the 25th and the 50th per centile suggest that firms
with higher debt capacity tend to increase market leverage significantly following the state’s
adoption of anti-recharacterization laws. Nevertheless, the coefficient estimate of the dummy
variable “Law” for firms in the 75th per centile of leverage distribution is not statistically
significant, in part because highly levered firms have a lower capacity for additional external
financing. These firms are already operating either close to or within the zone of financial
neither market leverage nor balance sheet leverage declines with non-financial liabilities. This suggests that
market leverage is a robust measure of firms leverage.
13Ref. Table [1], reported mean(median) of leverage 0.234(0.181).
14See Cameron and Trivedi (2010), Koenker and Basset (1978), Koenker and Hallock (2001) for detailed
discussion on quantile regression analysis.
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distresss. Therefore, such firms on average have a higher probability of passing up otherwise
positive net present value investment opportunities or projects (Myers, 1984). That is, the
marginal benefit from an additional dollar of external financing (as a result of exogenous
increase in debt capacity due to the state adoption of anti-recharacterization laws) is less
than the marginal cost.
[INSERT TABLE 2[A] & TABLE 2[B] ABOUT HERE]
4.1.2 External Financing Choice: Short-term Debt vs. Long-term Debt
So far, the estimates reported in Table 2[A&B] demonstrate that the adoption of
anti-recharacterization laws is positively associated with increase in debt capacity.
However, the average firm debt consists of short-term and long-term debt. Short-term debt
tends to consist mostly of bank debt while long-term debt tends to reflect long-term
liabilities and obligations from the market. Hence, short-term debt financing serves as a
robust proxy for bank financing and long-term debt financing serves as a robust proxy for
market or public debt (Boughes, Mizen and Yalcin, 2006). The main goal of this section is
to address the concern that the effects of anti-recharacterization laws on debt capacity
might be heterogeneous and dependent on source of external financing: Does the adoption
of anti-rechracterization laws affect debt structure? The financial flexibility that comes
from substituting short-term debt for long-term debt financing reflects the option-value of
unused debt capacity15. As access to external financing improves, firms substitute away
from costly forms of external financing. In order to test this conjecture, I estimate the
effects of anti-recharacterization laws on financial choices of firms using the following
reduced form difference-in-difference regression model {augmented form of Equation [1]}:
Leveragei,s,t = αi + β1Lawi,s,t +X
′
itψ + γLeveragei,s,t−1 + ηi + δt + ǫit (3)
Where Leveragei,s,t is either short-term debt or long-term debt scaled by total assets.
Equation [3] includes initial or previous period leverage. The inclusion of initial leverage
15See DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Whited (2011) for discussion on the option value of debt capacity.
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addresses two concerns: [i] Managers might be concerned about the long-term equilibrium
level of leverage, which might lead to low explanatory power (Lemmon et al., 2008); [ii]
Extant literature has documented that firms tend to rebalance leverage less frequently (Leary
and Roberts, 2005). These two concerns imply that not including initial or lagged leverage
in the model might lead to bias estimates. All standard errors are clustered at the firm-level.
Table [3] evaluates the response of financial choices to the state adoption of
anti-recharacterization laws controlling for firm specific characteristics. Intuitively, we
would expect that as creditors’ rights strengthen, firms would be more likely to substitute
short-term debt for long-term debt financing. This is because short-term debt tends to
consist mainly of bank acceptances and overdrafts, and notes payable to banks and other
intermediaries. While long-term debt tends to consists of capitalise leases, commercial
paper, debentures, convertible debt, subordinated debt and bonds-and-notes16. This
implies that short-term debt tends to be mainly bank finance and long-term debt
consisting mainly of market or public debt. On average, bank debt is costlier due to costly
state verifications (Diamond 1984, 1991). Anti-recharacterization laws enhance
repossession of pledgeability assets during bankruptcy or financial distress, which results in
increase in debt capacity. Firms respond to this increase in access to debt financing by
substituting between bank debt financing and market debt financing.
The results in Table [3] are strongly in support of the above prediction. Models [1-3]
present estimates in which the dependent variable is long-term debt scaled by total assets.
The coefficient of the dummy variable “Law” is positive and statistically significant across all
three models. These results suggest that the adoption of anti-recharacterization laws- that is,
strengthening of creditors rights-is positively related to long-term (market) debt financing.
The results are also consistent with the notion that firms with collaterized assets have
greater access to long-term debt financing. In addition, since the laws enhance creditors
ability to repossess pledgeable assets, firms with a high collateral base significantly increase
the fraction of long-term debt in their capital structure. Economically, the adoption of anti-
16See Welch (2010) for detailed discussion on balance sheet components of total liabilities.
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recharacterization laws is associated with an increase of 3.5% in long-term debt financing.
Models [4-6] present estimates where the dependent variable is the ratio of short-term debt
to total assets. The coefficient of the dummy variable “Law” is negative and statistically
significant across all models. Economically, the adoption of anti-recharacterization laws is
associated with a decline of 7.2% in short-term debt financing. This result suggests that
as creditors’ rights improve, firms tend to substitute away from costly bank debt financing
and instead increase the fraction of market debt in their capital structure. This result is
consistent with the observation that as the value of collateral increases, firms tend to reduce
short-term debt financing (Bougheas et al., 2006), since collateral is associated with increased
access to market debt.
Overall, the results in Table [3] demonstrate that the effects of anti-recharacterization
laws are not only limited to increase in leverage but the laws also affect the dynamic
relationship between short-term debt and long-term debt financing. On average, firms
respond to the adoption of anti-recharacterization laws by reducing the fraction of
short-term debt and increasing the fraction of long-term debt in their capital structure.
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
4.2 Anti-recharacterization Laws and Financing Activities:
Securities Issuance Decisions
4.2.1 Financing Activity: Effects of Laws on Debt Issuance
Does debt issuance behavior vary with the adoption of anti-recharacterization laws? Since
anti-recharacterization laws enhance the value of pledgeable assets and facilitate swift seizure
of collateral during bankruptcy; we would expect that the laws are positively related to
debt issuance. Anti-recharacterization laws effectively transfer some control rights from
borrowers to creditors. Hence, creditors are more willing to extend credit to firms in adopting
jurisdictions, which increases firms’ access to external financing. That is, the laws induce
financial flexibility as a result of increase in the option-value of unused debt capacity. Ceteris
paribus, firms would response to this exogenous change in debt capacity by issuing debt.
Table [4] presents estimates in which debt issuance is the dependent variable. Debt
issuance is estimated as the sum of issuance of long-term debt (dltr) and changes in current
debt (dlchh) scaled by total assets17. Models [1&2] present panel regression estimates of debt
issuance on an indicator for the state adoption of anti-recharacterization laws, controlling
for firm specific characteristics. Consistent with the above prediction, the coefficient of the
indicator variable “Law” is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that on average
firms tend to issue more debt following the adoption of anti-recharacterization laws.
Nevertheless, there might be some concerns that the reported effects of
anti-recharacterization laws on debt issuance might simply reflect the effects of the laws on
changes in leverage. First, this cannot be the case, since changes in leverage reflects
changes in debt capacity. The first reassuring evidence comes from univariate analysis. The
correlation between debt issuance and change in leverage is about 26% in the data. To
further address this issue, I use change in leverage as the dependent variable in models
[3&4] of Table [4]. The coefficient of the dummy variable “Law” is positive and statistically
significant at the 1% level. However, observe that the coefficient estimates of the dummy
variable “Law” in models [1&2] are statistically different from the coefficients estimates
reported in models [3&4]. The results indicate that changes in total leverage reflect changes
in debt capacity. Thus, the results in models [3&4] supports the notion that the adoption
of anti-recharacterization laws is positively related to debt capacity. The results in models
[1&2] suggest that improvement in creditors’ rights leads to increase in debt issuance.
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
How does security issuance vary with the adoption of anti-recharacterization laws?
Extant literature documents that frequency of security issuance is not only prevalent but
might also reflect special features of the issuing firm (Billet et al. 2011, Ritter and Huang,
2018). That is, firms that are frequent issuers might be very different from firms that are
passive issuers. Hence, the effects of state adoption of anti-recharacterization laws on
securities issuance might be heterogeneous across firms. Firms that actively issue debt are
17Debt issuance definition is consistent with Frank and Goyal, (2015).
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more likely to increase debt issuance following the adoption of the laws.
In Table [5] firms are sorted into active debt issuers and passive debt issuers. In models
[1-4] active firms are classified as those firms that have a debt issuance in excess of 5% of
total assets, otherwise a firm is classified as passive debt issuer. To ensure that the above
cut-off is not too restrictive, models [5-8] present estimates for which active debt issuers
are classified as those firms that issue debt in excess of 3% of total assets18. On the other
hand, passive debt issuers are those firms that issue debt less than 3% of firm total assets.
Consistent with the above prediction, I find that the coefficient estimate of active debt issuers
is positive, statistically significant and greater in magnitude than the coefficient estimate of
passive debt issuers. The results suggest that the effects of anti-recharacterization laws on
debt issuance decision is more profound amongst firms that are active issuers of debt. The
combined results of Tables [7&8] suggest that the likelihood of debt issuance increases with
the adoption of anti-recharacterization laws and that this result is mostly driven by firms
that proactively rebalance leverage.
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
4.2.2 Financing Activity: Effects of Laws on Equity Issuance
The results in Tables [2-5] demonstrate that firms increase both leverage and debt issuance
following the adoption of anti-recharacterization laws. Intuitively, we would expect that
as access to leverage increases, firms might reduce not only equity issuance but also the
frequency of equity issuance. This is partly because large equity issuance is costlier than
debt issuance of similar size. In addition, the market react differently to equity issuance
than debt issuance. Equity issuance is generally associated with overvaluation. Indeed,
the announcement of equity issuance is associated with stock decline (Asquith and Mullins,
1986, Bayless and Chapkinsky 1996, Loughran and Ritter, 1995, Ritter, 2002)19. While
equity issuances are followed by significantly lower raw returns, the announcement of public
18Sorting is similar to Frank and Goyal (2015) , Ritter and Huang (2018)
19Billett et al (2006)“Numerous studies document substantial underperformance during the three-five years
following security issuances, issuing firms...underperforms the relevant benchmarks by 4% to 10%.”
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debt issuance is associated with non-zero to slightly positive returns (Jung, Kim and Stulz,
1996). Note also that frequent issuers of equity tend to not only have lower book-to-market
ratios, but are also less profitable. Since anti-recharacterization laws enhance access to
external financing, firms might subsitute away from issuing costly equity. That is, the
adoption of anti-recharacterization laws might induce substitution effects amongst financial
choices. Ceteris paribus, we would expect a negative relationship between adoption of anti-
recharacterization laws and equity issuance for firms incorporated in adopting jurisdictions.
To test whether firms proactively reduce equity issuance following the adoption of anti-
recharacterization laws, I follow a similar approach to Denis and McKeon (2012). To this
effect, I employ sale of common and preferred stocks (SSTK) as the proxy for equity issuance.
SSTK is a robust proxy as it takes into account both active external equity offerings to outside
investors and proceeds from exercise of employee options. Equity issuance is estimated
as sale of common and preferred stocks scaled by total assets. Table [6] presents panel
regression model estimates predicting the effects of anti-recharacterization laws on equity
issuance. Models [1&2] control for firm size, profitability, tangibility and market-to-book.
The coefficient of the indicator variable “Law” is negative and statistically significant at the
1% level. The results are consistent with the above prediction and establish that firms reduce
equity issues after state adoption of anti-recharacterization laws. Models [3&4] control for
additional covariates; the results are consistent with those reported in models [1&2]. Equity
issuance is negatively correlated with state adoption of anti-recharacterization laws.
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
The next step is to consider the frequency of equity issuance. It could be the case that
firms that actively issue equity behave differently from firms that infrequently or passively
issue equity. To be consistent with prior literature (Frank and Goyal, 2015, Ritter and Huang,
2018), a firm is classified as an “Active” equity issuer if its sale of common and preferred
stocks is greater than 5% of total assets; otherwise the firm is classified as a“Passive” equity
issuer.
Table [7] presents estimates in which firms are sorted by whether they are “Active” or
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“Passive” equity issuers. Models [1&3] present estimates for firms that proactively issue
equity. Models [2&4] present estimates for passive issuers of equity. The results demonstrate
that firms that proactively issue equity reduce equity issuance following the adoption of
anti-recharacterization laws. These findings show that the estimates reported in Table [6]
are mostly driven by proactive equity issuers.
Overall, the results in Table [7] are consistent with the notion that proactive equity issuers
tend to have greater and pressing needs for external financing. Indeed, prior literature
finds that immediate need for financing due to squeeze in internal funds is a significant
predictor of equity issuance (Ritter and Huang, 2017). Additionally, since the adoption
of anti-recharacterization laws is associated with increase in access to external financing,
proactive issuers reduce equity issuance more than passive issuers. This is because it is
more costly to issue equity than to issue debt, and active equity issuers benefit more from
the easier access to debt financing following anti-recharacterization laws. The results are
consistent with the notion that even a small divergence in the costs between equity and debt
issuance significantly affects firms’ securities issuance decisions. In such cases, firms tend to
significantly issue debt over equity.
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]
5 Robustness
5.1 Endogeneity and Falsification Test: Placebo Effect
One concern is that the documented effects of anti-recharacterization laws on debt capacity
and financing activities might simply be due to some action(s) other than the adoption of the
laws. To address this concern, I closely follow the placebo test outlined in Angrist and Kruger
(1999)20. I start by using a different subsample of firms incorporated in those states that have
not adopted anti-recharacterization laws. In my setting, the treatment is the adoption of
anti-recharacterization laws and the “treatment effects” are: [1] Increase in market leverage,
20See Balakrishan, Billings, Kelly and Ljungvist, (2014) for a similar setting in the context of liquidity
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[2] Decline in equity issuance and [3] Increase in debt issuance. In order to infer any causal
relationship between the adoption of anti-recharacterization laws and the above treatment
effects, the placebo test should not yield similar “treatment effects”. Otherwise, the outlined
treatment effects might be attributable to either ommitted variable(s) problem or some
unobserved action(s), but not to anti-recharacterization laws.
In implementing the placebo tests, I first create a matched sample of firms (placebo group)
incorporated in a state of similar characteristics to the adopting state. These characteristics
includes similar population size, location proximity and economic activity (GDP) to the
state that has adopted anti-recharacterization laws. To create the subsample, I first begin
by creating a subset of states of similar characteristics as the state that has adopted anti-
recharacterization laws; I then randomly selects a state from this subset. This process is
then repeated for each of the seven states under study. This selection process results in a
new subsample- which serves as the “control group”. In the new subsample, Louisiana is
replaced by Kentucky, Virginia is replaced by Washington, Alabama is replaced by South
Carolina, Delaware is replaced by Montana, Texas is replaced by Michigan, South Dakota
is replaced by North Dakota and Nevada is replaced by Arkansas. The key idea here is that
if the documented treatment effects are attributable to a placebo effect, we would expect
to observe similar treatment effects in the subsample- that is in the states that have not
adopted anti-recharacterization laws. In order to estimate this effect, I create a dummy
variable: “Placebo law”. The dummy takes a value equal to “1” for firms incorporated in:
Kentucky and Michigan after 1997, in North Dakota after 2003, in Washington after 2004,
in Montana after 2002, in South Carolina after 2001 and in Arkansas after 2005. Otherwise,
“Placebo Law” equals zero.
The results in Table [8] indicate that the coefficient of the dummy variable “Placebo
Law” is statistically insignificant. The results demonstrate that the “placebo group” does
not yield the same treatment effects as the “treatment group”. That is, the effects
attributable to the staggered adoption of anti-recharacterization laws are not observable in
the “control group”. The absence of “treatment effects” in the placebo group is strong
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evidence that the documented treatment effects are indeed mostly driven by the state
adoption of anti-recharacterization laws and not by potential confounding effects or
omitted variable(s) problem.
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE]
5.2 Legal Challenge(s): Federal Laws vs. State Laws
In 2003 anti-recharacterization laws were challenged in the federal courts. In the case of,
Reaves Brokerage Company Inc. v. Sunbelt Fruit & Vegetable Company, the federal court
recharacterized the debtor’s transfer. The creditors were unable to repossess collateral
during this specific bankruptcy case. The court’s decision increased uncertainty regarding
the viability and enforceability of state-level anti-recharacterization laws. However, note
that the federal court’s ruling in this case did not completely overturn the state-level
anti-recharacterization laws; the ruling simply set a precedent upon which future cases
might challenge the state’s anti-recharacterization laws. Indeed, in the 2016 case of
Pacifica L 51 LLC vs. New Investments Inc., the 9th circuits ruled that “...a debtor may
“cure” a default only by fulfilling the debtor’s obligations under its loan agreement,
including payment of interest at a higher post-default rate”21’22.The key concern here is
that the potential challenges to the laws might weaken the effects of anti-recharacterization
laws, which would weaken the documented “treatment effects”.
To address this concern, I create a dummy variable “Law3states” which takes a value of
“1” if a state passed anti-recharacterization laws before 2002, and equals to zero if otherwise.
This means that there are only three states under study, namely Texas and Louisiana, which
passed anti-recharacterization laws in 1997, and Alabama, which passed the laws in 2001.
In this case, the “treated firms” are those incorporated in these three states.
The estimates reported in Table [9] below are generally consistent with the estimates
reported in Tables [2-7]. The results in models [1-6] suggest that firms incorporated in these
21For details see https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2016/11/04/13-36194.pdf
22https://www.quarles.com/christopher-combest/publications-and-presentations/lenders-are-entitled-to-
default-interest-in-chapter-11-ninth-circuit/
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three states increased market leverage, increased debt issuance and decreased equity issuance
following state adoption of anti-recharacterization laws. Observe also that the reported
coefficient estimates of “Law3states” are higher than those reported for all seven states.
These results are consistent with the notion that changes in market leverage and securities
issuances are a product of changes in both the value of collateral and debt capacity (Li,
Whited and Wu, 2016).
[INSERT TABLE 9[A&B] ABOUT HERE]
5.3 Balance Sheet Expansion: Growth in Firm-Level Covariates
One potential concern with the above findings is that controlling for firm-level covariates does
not take into account the effects of changes in the firm’s determinants. The key concern here
is that the documented “treatment effects” might be attributable to mechanical balance
sheet expansion and not to the passage of anti-recharacterization laws. Table [10] reports
estimates controlling for changes in covariates and the interaction of these changes with the
indicator variable “Law”. Models [1&2] document that even after controlling for changes in
covariates, the coefficient of the“Law” dummy is still positive and statistically significant at
the 1% level.
Additionally, it could be the case that changes in covariates will have a more pronounced
effect on changes in market leverage. To address this concern, change in market leverage is
the dependent variable in models [3&4]. Consistent with the above results, the coefficient
of “Law” is positive and statistically significant at 1% level. The estimates in models [1-4]
demonstrate that the positive effect of the state adoption of anti-recharacterization laws on
market leverage is robust to controlling for balance sheet expansion.
In models [5&6] equity issuance is the dependent variable. The coefficient of the
indicator variable “Law” is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. The
estimates are consistent with those reported in Table [6] above. Observe that the
coefficient of change in profitability is negative, which is consistent with Frank and Goyal
(2015). Contrastingly, the interaction of changes in profits and the indicator “Law” is
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positive and statistically significant at 1% level. Observe also that the interaction term
between size and the indicator variable “Law” is negative and statistically significant at the
1% level. This results suggest that large firms are less likely to issue equity even after the
state adoption of anti-recharacterization laws. Large firms tend to be less financially
constrained since they have access to external financing. Intuitively, we would expect that
following state adoption of anti-recharacterization laws, financially unconstrained firms
would reduce equity issuance. The adoption of laws enhances access to additional debt
financing. Additionally, since equity issuance is more costly, unconstrained firms are more
likely to substitute away from equity financing.
[INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE]
To address this concern, I sort firms based on financial constraints measure. I employ
the Whited-Wu index (2006)- WWI henceforth- as the measure of financial constraints.
Table [11] reports estimates in which firms are sorted based on WWI. Firms whose index
value is above median are classified as “High”- these firms are more likely to be financial
constrained. meanwhile firms below median WWI are classified as “Low”- these firms are less
likely to be financial constrained. As expected, the empirical results in Table [11] support
the above conjecture. The results in models [1&3] demonstrate that the negative effect of the
adoption of anti-recharacterization laws on equity issuance is mainly driven by financially
unconstrained firms. Financially unconstrained firms are more likely to access external debt
financing, especially post state adoption of anti-recharacterization laws. There is no evidence
that financially constrained firms reduce equity issuance.
[INSERT TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE]
5.4 Accounting for the Effects of Anti-recharacterization laws on
Equity Repurchases
So far, the results demonstrate that firms on average reduce equity issuance following the
state adoption of anti-recharacterization laws. The next step is to establish whether the
adoption of these laws affects stock repurchases. Anti-recharacterization laws are positively
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associated with market leverage and debt issuance, implying that firms are more likely not
only to reduce equity issuance but might also increase stock repurchases.
Table [12] considers the effect of anti-recharacterization laws on equity repurchases.
Equity repurchases are estimated as purchase of common stock (prstkc) scaled by total
assets. Models [1&2] report results from regressions of equity repurchase on the indicator
variable “Law”, controlling for firm size, profitability, MB and tangibility. Columns [3&4]
present estimates controlling for changes in firm size, changes in profitability, changes in
MB and changes in tangibility. Models [4&5] control for interaction terms in addition to
firm-level controls. The results confirm the above prediction and establish that firms
increase stock repurchases after the state adoption of anti-recharacterization laws.
[INSERT TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE]
5.5 Which Firms Respond More Strongly?
In this section, I explore cross-sectional variation in firms’ responses to the adoption of anti-
recharacterization laws. The results in Table [2] demonstrate that on average firms increase
market leverage following the state adoption of laws. However, financially constrained firms
might behave very differently from their unconstrained counterparts (Ershin 2017, Chu 2018).
Following state adoption of anti-recharacterization laws, financially unconstrained firms are
more likely to reduce costly short-term debt financing and financially constrained firms are
less likely to reduce short-term debt. This is because anti-recharacterization laws strengthen
creditors’ rights, which enhance the value of pledgeable assets in place. As access to external
financing impoves, unconstrained firms face lower trade-off costs and are therefore more
likely to substitute between market debt and bank debt financing. As such we would expect
financially unconstrained firms to reduce costly short-term debt, which tends to be bank
financed.
On the other hand, financially constrained firms have improved access to external
financing, but this improved access is conditional on the value of pledgeable assets in place.
Financially constrained firms tend to have lower collateral assets in place relative to their
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unconstrained counterparts. Hence, the improved access to external financing implies that
financially constrained firms might increase market leverage but might not reduce costly
short-term debt. That is, we would expect to observe imperfect substitutability between
market debt and bank debt for financially constrained firms. Overall, following the
enactment of anti-recharacterization laws, we expect that unconstrained firms would reduce
short-term debt and financially constrained firms would increase market leverage.
In Table [13] firms are sorted based on the Whited-Wu index (2006). Higher index values
are associated with higher need for external financing. The dependent variable in models
[1&2] is market leverage and the dependent variable in models [3&4] is long-term debt scaled
by total assets. In models [5&6] the dependent variable is short-term debt scaled by total
assets. The results in Table [13] confirm the conjecture that financially constrained firms
increase market leverage and unconstrained firms reduce costly short-term debt financing.
As access to debt financing improves, unconstrained firms substitute between market debt
and bank debt.
Note also that the easier repossession of pledgeable assets following the enactment of
anti-recharacterization laws implies that creditors are more willing to provide debt financing
to financially constrained firms. Overall, the results indicate that following the adoption of
anti-recharacterization laws, constrained firms significantly increase market leverage while
unconstrained firms significantly reduce short-term debt. The results support the notion
that strengthening creditors’ rights facilitates lending activities and results in imperfect
substitutability between public debt and bank debt. These results are consistent with Chu
(2018) finding that “...financially constrained firms value additional debt capacity due to
increased ability to repossess collateral.”
[INSERT TABLE 13 ABOUT HERE]
5.6 Accounting for the Effects of the 2008 Financial Crisis
One potential concern is that some of the effects attributable to the state adoption of anti-
recharacterization laws might simply be picking up the adverse effects of the 2008 financial
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crisis. This conjecture is partly because there is quite an overlap between the post-crisis
period and the post-adoption period of anti-recharacterization laws. In order to address this
concern, I employ a difference-in-difference strategy in which I compare the variable(s) of
interest before and after the crisis. The coefficient “After” is a dummy variable that takes
the value of “1” for the years after 2008 and zero if otherwise.
Table [14] presents estimates with the dummy variable “After” as an additional control.
In models [1&2], I re-examine the effects of anti-recharacterization laws on market leverage
controlling for the effects of the 2008 financial crisis. The results show that the dummy
variable “Law” is positively related to market leverage. The effects are statistically significant
at the 1% level. In models [3&4], the dependent variable is equity issuance. The coefficient
estimate of “Laws” is negatively and statistically significant at the 1% level. Models [5&6]
show that the coefficient of “Law” is positive and weakly significant. Observe that both the
dummy “After” and the “After” are not significant in model [6]. The result is encouraging
as it suggests that the insignificance in model [6] is mostly driven by clustering effect and
not because the effect of the financial crisis subsumes the effect of the adoption of the anti-
recharacterization laws. Overall, the results in Table [13] demonstrate that the effects of state
adoption of anti-recharacterization laws on market leverage and equity issuance is robust to
accounting for the effects of the financial crisis.
[INSERT TABLE 14 ABOUT HERE]
5.7 Accounting for the Availability of Internal Funds
Under the pecking order theory (Myers, 1984), firms should prefer internal financing over
external financing. If additional funding is required, firms should first issue market debt
before issuing equity. This is partly because firms on average tend to face higher transaction
costs in the case of equity and debt financing than using straight cash. The key idea here
is that external financing is costly. Indeed, extant literature finds that firms tend to raise
funds only when they are squeezed for cash. McKeon and Denis (2012) document that urgent
demand for cash is a significant determinant of debt issuance. Ritter and Huang (2017) find
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that about 67% of issuers in their sample would have run out of cash by the end of the
fiscal year if they had not issued securities. And that immediate need for cash is the most
significant predictor of debt issuance. DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2010) find that about
63% of firms, in their sample, would have run out of cash in the preceding year if they did not
raise external capital. Overall, firms seem to trade-off the benefit of security issuance against
the information sensitivity cost(s) associated with security issuance. Hence, ceteris paribus
firms with high information asymmetry should have stronger preference for cash financing.
In the context of creditors’ rights laws, this conjecture implies that firms with significant
cash might be less responsive to the state adoption of anti-recharacterization laws.
Additionally, higher cash holdings firms might prefer to pay down existing debt, which
might further weaken the “treatment effects” from the adoption of anti-recharacterization
laws. Prior research finds that the fraction of pledgeable assets declines with increase and
availability of internal funds (Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2009). As such, we would expect a
negative relationship between cash and debt capacity. That is, we expect a negative
correlation between cash and market leverage, and a negative correlation between cash and
debt issuance. The conjecture effectively implies that firms with higher internal funds are
more likely to underreact to the staggered adoption of anti-recharacterization laws.
In Table [15], in addition to controlling for determinants of leverage, cash is also an
independent variable in the regression. Cash is defined as cash and cash equivalent market
securities (CHE) scaled by total assets. Consistent with the above conjecture, the coefficient
estimate of cash is negative across all models. The negative and statistically significant
coefficient of cash indicates that internal funds are an important determinant of market
leverage and financing activity. Prior literature has documented that firms with internal
capital tend to use such funds primarily for debt reduction (Byuon 2008, Denis and McKeon
2012).
In Table [15] panel [B], I test whether high cash holdings firms behave differently from
low cash holdings firms after the state adoption of anti-recharacterization laws. The results
confirm the notion that firms with high cash prefer or would rather reduce market leverage
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and reduce debt issuance than firms with low cash. The interaction term “LawxCash”
captures the joint effect of cash and adoption of anti-recharacterization laws. In models
[1-4], the coefficient estimate of the interaction term is negative and statistically significant
at 1% the level. The results demonstrate that firms incorporated in states with
anti-recharacterization laws that have high cash holdings decrease market leverage.
Observe also that the interaction effects do not subsume the documented “treatment
effects” attributable to the passage of anti-recharacterization laws. The coefficient estimate
of the dummy variable “Law” is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. In
models (7&8), debt issuance is the dependent variable. In this case, the coefficient of the
interaction term while negative is not statistically significant, indicating that there is no
evidence that firms with high cash reduce debt issuance activity. Overall, the results in Table
[15] suggest that cash is an important determinant of financing choice(s). Nevertheless, even
after controlling for cash holdings, the effects of anti-recharacterization laws on debt capacity
and financing activities is robust.
[INSERT TABLE 15(A&B) ABOUT HERE]
6 Conclusion
The existing literature has documented contrasting results on the effects of stronger creditors’
rights protection on external financing. Some papers find that stronger creditors’ rights
protection facilitates lending activities while others find that such rights depress secured
lending. Most of these works focus on cross-country settings, legal origins and institutional
comparisons, and as such suffer from the fact that cross-country differentials are significant
enough to generate contradictory results. Hence, the relationship between stronger creditors’
rights protection and firms’ financing choices is still not well understood.
In this paper, I use the passage of anti-recharacterization laws by seven U.S. states as a
quasi-natural experiment. The main motivation behind these laws is to enhance the ability
of creditors to extract and repossess collateral during bankruptcy or during financial
distress. Using a difference-in-difference methodology, I estimate the causal impacts of
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anti-recharacterization laws on firms’ financing choices and securities issuance. Firstly, I
document that for firms incorporated in the adopting states, the passage of
anti-recharacterization laws is associated with increase in access to external financing. The
laws are positively related to market leverage. I also show that anti-recharacterization laws
affect debt dynamics; firms substitute away from costly short-term debt financing towards
long-term debt financing.
Second, I examine the effects of anti-recharacterization laws on firms’ financing activities.
I show that these laws are positively related to debt issuance and negatively related to
equity issuance. These results are more pronounced amongst firms that are proactive issuers
of securities. Proactive issuers of debt significantly increase debt issuance while proactive
issuers of equity significantly reduce equity issuance. In summary, my results support the
notion that stronger creditors’ rights protection enhances lending activities and result in
more efficient capital markets.
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Figure 1: Evolution of Average Market Leverage
TABLE 1: Summary Statistics:
The sample comes from the annual Compustat files. The sample period is 1990-2012. I exclude
financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-4999). Cash is estimated as cash and mar-
ketable securities adjusted by total assets. Investment is CAPX adjusted by total assets. Tangibility
is estimated as property, plant and equipment scaled by total assets. Profits is estimated as oper-
ation income before depreciation adjusted by total assets. Leverage is estimated as debt in current
period liability plus long-term debt scaled by total assets. Networking capital is estimated as net-
working capital net of cash scaled by total assets.Market leverage is estimated as in Equation [1].
Debt issuance is estimated as issuance of long-term debt(dltis) plus increase in current debt (dlcch).
Equity issuance is estimated as sale of common stock. Equity purchase is estimated as the sale of
common stock. Dividend dummy equals to 1 if a firm pays dividend in that fiscal year, otherwise
it’s equal to zero
Mean Median Std. Dev 25th 75th
Summary Statistics:
Cash 0.204 0.0954 0.247 0.0237 0.299
Ln(assets) 4.56 4.53 2.46 2.91 6.22
MB 2.30 1.52 2.43 1.09 2.45
Investment 0.067 0.039 1.001 0.016 0.0749
Equity Issuance 0.127 0.004 0.382 0.00 0.042
Tangibility 0.265 0.187 0.265 0.077 0.387
Leverage 0.234 0.181 0.231 0.0175 0.3747
Ln(Sale) 4.62 4.51 2.62 2.89 6.30
Profits -0.056 0.093 1.02 -0.03 0.16
Debt Issuance 0.0701 0.00 0.296 0.00 0.08
Net Leverage 0.029 0.073 0.403 -0.22 0.313
Equity Repurchase 0.0138 0.000 0.0597 0.000 0.0211
Market Leverage 0.21 0.12 0.24 0.01 0.35
Dividend Dummy 0.328 0.000 0.469 0.000 1.000
Net working Capital -0.283 0.041 25.5 -0.067 0.185
Acquisition Activity 0.089 0.000 9.9 0.000 0.004
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TABLE 2A: Creditors Rights and Leverage:
This table presents results from a regression analysis where the dependent variable is market leverage
in columns[1-4]. Market leverage estimation is as in Equation [1] above. The dependent variable is
total leverage in columns[5-6]. The explanatory variables: Size is estimated as natural logarithms
of total sales. Tangibility, profitability and MB are described in Table[1]. All estimations include
firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at firm-level. Within R2 is reported.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Market Leverage Market Leverage Market Leverage Market Leverage Leverage Leverage
Law 0.0297*** 0.0297*** 0.0127*** 0.0127* 0.0246** 0.0246
(8.93) (4.03) (3.81) (1.75) (2.22) (1.42)
Size 0.0258*** 0.0258*** 0.0374*** 0.0374***
(43.71) (22.12) (19.12) (3.78)
Tangibility 0.233*** 0.233*** 0.135*** 0.135**
(42.23) (19.56) (7.38) (2.51)
Profitability -0.00961*** -0.00961*** -0.426*** -0.426***
(-9.42) (-2.70) (-126.02) (-2.81)
MB -0.000284*** -0.000284 0.00191*** 0.00191*
(-9.19) (-1.17) (18.68) (1.92)
Constant 0.212*** 0.212*** 0.0394*** 0.0394*** 0.307*** 0.307***
(376.13) (321.23) (12.76) (6.39) (30.03) (7.22)
Firm F.E YES YES YES YES YES YES
Clustered Std Errors NO YES NO YES NO YES
Year F.E NO YES NO YES NO YES
N 107,701 107,701 103,650 103,650 103,649 103,649
R2 0.00162 0.00162 0.0997 0.0997 0.124 0.124
NOTE: t-statistics in parentheses:* p:0.10, ** p:0.05, *** p:0.01
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TABLE 2B: Quantile Regression: Market Leverage:
This table presents results from quantile regression analysis where the dependent variable is market
leverage in columns[1-4]. Equation [1] replicates results from Equation [3] in Table [2A]. Columns
[2-4] presents estimates from quantile regression analysis. The explanatory variables: Size is es-
timated as natural logarithms of total sales. Tangibility, profitability and MB are described in
Table[1]. All estimations include firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at firm-level.
Within R2 is reported.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Market Levarage Market Leverage Market Leverage Market Leverage
Quantile Regression Estimates
Law 0.0127* 0.00390*** 0.00615** -0.000517
(1.75) (3.85) (2.23) (-0.10)
Size 0.0258*** 0.00464*** 0.0143*** 0.0249***
(22.12) (10.83) (73.55) (38.63)
Tangibility 0.233*** 0.171*** 0.337*** 0.443***
(19.56) (45.45) (81.25) (65.76)
Profitability -0.00961*** -0.00791*** -0.0193*** -0.000963
(-2.70) (-7.16) (-12.33) (-0.27)
MB -0.000284 -0.00191*** -0.00312*** -0.000941
(-1.17) (-3.66) (-10.30) (-0.67)
Constant 0.0394*** -0.0181*** -0.00798*** 0.0991***
(6.39) (-5.66) (-6.97) (17.40)
Firm & Year F.E YES NO NO NO
Clustered Std Errors YES NO NO NO
Robust Std Errors YES YES YES
Regression Type FE 25th% 50th% 75th%
N 103,650 103,650 103,650 103,650
R2 0.0997
Pseudo R2 0.056 0.102 0.078
NOTE: t-statistics in parentheses:* p:0.10, ** p:0.05, *** p:0.01
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TABLE 3: Creditors Rights and Leverage:
This table presents results from a regression analysis where the dependent variable is long term debt
in columns [1-3]. And the dependent variable is short-term debt in columns [4-6]. The explanatory
variables: Size is estimated as natural logarithms of total sales. Tangibility, profitability and MB
are described in Table[1]. All estimations include firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
at firm-level. Within R2 is reported.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LT Debt LT Debt LT Debt ST Debt ST Debt ST Debt
Law 0.00575*** 0.00601*** 0.00601* -0.00452** -0.00452** -0.00452*
(2.19) (2.58) (1.73) (-2.50) (-2.50) (-1.93)
LTDebtt−1 0.468*** 0.468***
(159.49) (73.94)
STDebtt−1 0.260*** 0.260***
(77.87) (26.25)
Size 0.0151*** 0.0109*** 0.0109*** 0.00158 0.00332*** 0.00332***
(32.58) (25.28) (15.93) (4.69) (9.92) (6.03)
Tangibility 0.170*** 0.127*** 0.127*** 0.0636*** 0.0604*** 0.0604***
(39.33) (32.13) (17.51) (20.32) (19.66) (11.21)
Profitability -0.00449*** -0.0105*** -0.0105*** -0.0158*** -0.0190*** -0.0190***
(-5.61) (-12.62) (-3.87) (-27.25) (-29.55) (-4.75)
MB -0.0000716*** -0.000913*** -0.000913*** -0.000751*** -0.000751*** -0.000751***
(-2.95) (-9.48) (-4.20) (-10.04) (-2.01) (-3.83)
Constant 0.0478*** 0.00243 0.00243 0.0358*** 0.0123*** 0.0123***
(19.77) (1.04) (0.63) (20.40) (6.79) (4.15)
Firm F.E YES YES YES YES YES YES
Clustered Std Errors NO NO YES NO NO YES
Year F.E NO NO YES NO NO YES
N 103,650 96,890 96,890 103,650 96,890 96,890
R2 0.0284 0.253 0.253 0.0135 0.0789 0.0789
NOTE: t-statistics in parentheses: * p:0.10, ** p:0.05, *** p:0.01
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TABLE 4: Creditors Rights and Debt Issuance:
This table presents results from a regression analysis where the dependent variable is debt issuance in columns[1-2]. The de-
pendent variable is change in total leverage in columns[3-4]. The explanatory variables: Size is estimated as natural logarithms
of total sales. All explanatory variables are described in Table[1]. All estimations include firm fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered at firm-level. Within R2 is reported.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Debt Issuance Debt Issuance ∆Leveraget,t−1 ∆Leveraget,t−1
Law 0.0189** 0.0189* 0.0117*** 0.0117***
(2.41) (1.65) (3.69) (3.74)
Size 0.0149*** 0.0149*** 0.0185*** 0.0185***
(10.30) (3.78) (28.56) (17.47)
Cash Flow 0.00417*** 0.00417** -0.0179*** -0.0179***
(5.90) (2.11) (-13.15) (-3.90)
NWC -0.00352 -0.00352 -0.0138*** -0.0138*
(-0.92) (-0.24) (-11.51) (-1.65)
Investment 0.169*** 0.169*** 0.197*** 0.197***
(10.00) (3.19) (22.59) (11.10)
Profitability -0.0109*** -0.0109* -0.00622*** -0.00622
(-4.87) (-1.67) (-3.37) (-0.72)
Tangibility 0.0137 0.0137 0.0920*** 0.0920***
(1.04) (0.60) (16.01) (11.08)
MB 0.00283*** 0.00283 -0.00176*** -0.00176***
(14.20) (1.07) (-11.56) (-3.73)
Market Cap -0.00731*** -0.00731 -0.0131*** -0.0131***
(-5.74) (-1.64) (-23.01) (-13.05)
Acquisitions 0.000421* 0.000421 0.000422*** 0.000422
(1.68) (0.97) (2.71) (0.62)
Dividend Dummy 0.00420 0.00420 -0.0118*** -0.0118***
(1.10) (0.87) (-7.35) (-6.06)
R&D 0.0195*** 0.0195** -0.000798 -0.000798
(3.11) (1.97) (-0.28) (-0.25)
Constant 0.00198 0.00198 -0.0293*** -0.0293***
(0.26) (0.18) (-8.70) (-6.25)
Firm F.E YES YES YES YES
Clustered Std. Errors NO YES NO YES
Year F.E NO YES NO YES
N 47,304 47,304 90,528 90,528
R2 0.0123 0.0123 0.0355 0.0355
NOTE:t- statistics in parentheses * p:0.10, ** p:0.05, *** p:0.01
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TABLE 5: Active vs Passive Debt Issuers:
This table presents results from a regression analysis where the dependent variable is debt issuance. Firms are sorted into active vs
passive debt issuers. A firm is classified as active debt issuance if it issue debt in excess of 5% of the value of assets- columns[1-4]
or if it issue debt in excess of 3% of total debt- columns[5-8]. The explanatory variables are explained in Table [1] above. All
estimations include firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at firm-level. Within R2 is reported.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Debt Issuance Debt Issuance Debt Issuance Debt Issuance Debt Issuance Debt Issuance Debt Issuance Debt Issuance
5% of Assets
3% of Assets
Active Passive Active Passive Active Passive Active Passive
Law 0.0522** -0.00484 0.0522* -0.00484 0.0450** -0.00304 0.0450* -0.00304
(2.41) (-1.00) (1.70) (-1.19) (2.50) (-0.57) (1.85) (-0.68)
Size 0.0168*** -0.00125 0.0168** -0.00125 0.0154*** -0.00200** 0.0154** -0.00200
(3.36) (-1.49) (2.38) (-0.89) (3.59) (-2.24) (2.15) (-1.40)
Profitability -0.0308*** 0.00401* -0.0308** 0.00401 -0.0417*** 0.00717*** -0.0417** 0.00717
(-3.94) (1.81) (-2.00) (0.29) (-6.01) (3.08) (-2.25) (0.52)
Cash Flow 0.00217* 0.00512*** 0.00217 0.00512 0.00292*** 0.00108 0.00292** 0.00108
(1.83) (2.82) (1.42) (0.40) (2.67) (0.56) (2.03) (0.08)
NWC -0.0652*** 0.0189*** -0.0652** 0.0189 -0.0475*** 0.0209*** -0.0475* 0.0209
(-4.40) (8.24) (-2.14) (1.25) (-3.71) (8.64) (-1.79) (1.35)
Investment 0.0265 0.0244* 0.0265 0.0244 0.0635** 0.00375 0.0635 0.00375
(0.77) (1.69) (0.50) (1.16) (2.09) (0.24) (1.13) (0.17)
Acquisitions 0.00580*** -0.0000926 0.00580 -0.0000926* 0.00588*** -0.000101 0.00588 -0.000101*
(4.15) (-0.75) (0.88) (-1.71) (4.49) (-0.80) (0.91) (-1.86)
MB 0.00929*** -0.00288*** 0.00929*** -0.00288** 0.00684*** -0.00307*** 0.00684** -0.00307**
(18.89) (-16.27) (4.02) (-1.97) (17.07) (-16.24) (2.11) (-1.98)
Market Cap -0.0221*** 0.00790*** -0.0221*** 0.00790*** -0.0166*** 0.00870*** -0.0166*** 0.00870***
(-5.70) (10.17) (-3.39) (4.35) (-5.04) (10.41) (-2.62) (4.54)
Dividend Dummy 0.0115 0.000302 0.0115 0.000302 0.00860 0.000157 0.00860 0.000157
(1.04) (0.13) (0.81) (0.15) (0.91) (0.06) (0.70) (0.08)
R&D 0.0301 0.00456 0.0301 0.00456 0.0228 0.00339 0.0228 0.00339
(1.58) (1.23) (1.39) (1.18) (1.44) (0.84) (1.28) (0.79)
Constant 0.218*** -0.0400*** 0.218*** -0.0400*** 0.178*** -0.0427*** 0.178*** -0.0427***
(8.63) (-9.24) (6.85) (-6.39) (8.23) (-9.26) (6.08) (-6.59)
Firm F.E YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Clustered std Errors NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
Year F.E NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
N 14,272 33,032 14,272 33,032 16,802 30,502 16,802 30,502
R2 0.0643 0.0290 0.0643 0.0290 0.0490 0.0293 0.0490 0.0293
NOTE: t-statistics in parentheses* p:0.10, ** p:0.05, *** p:0.01
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Table 6: Creditors Rights and Equity Issuance:This table presents results from a re-
gression analysis where the dependent variable is equity issuance. The explanatory variables in
columns[1&2]: Size is estimated as natural logarithms of total sales. Tangibility, profitability and
MB are described in Table[1]. Columns[3&4] include additional variables. All estimations include
firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at firm-level. Within R2 is reported.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Equity Issuance Equity Issuance Equity Issuance Equity Issuance
Law -0.0195*** -0.0195*** -0.0264*** -0.0264***
(-3.75) (-2.94) (-5.10) (-4.20)
Size -0.0545*** -0.0545*** -0.0775*** -0.0775***
(-59.68) (-19.86) (-76.56) (-24.05)
Profits -0.149*** -0.149*** -0.134*** -0.134***
(-95.24) (-4.96) (-70.85) (-3.64)
Tangibility -0.197*** -0.197*** -0.182*** -0.182***
(-23.15) (-11.40) (-19.95) (-6.16)
MB 0.000761*** 0.000761 0.00399*** 0.00399**
(16.06) (1.16) (28.00) (2.25)
Cash Flow -0.00556*** -0.00556*
(-8.54) (-1.86)
NWC -0.00576*** -0.00576
(-3.08) (-0.45)
Investment 0.230*** 0.230*
(17.15) (1.80)
Market Cap 0.0521*** 0.0521***
(58.36) (16.73)
Acquisitions -0.0000402 -0.0000402
(-0.16) (-0.09)
Dividend Dummy 0.0707*** 0.0707***
(27.01) (20.21)
R&D 0.0189*** 0.0189**
(4.08) (2.57)
Constant 0.405*** 0.405*** 0.205*** 0.205***
(85.22) (30.01) (35.41) (14.70)
Firm F.E YES YES YES YES
Year F.E NO YES NO YES
Clustered Std. Errors NO YES NO YES
N 101,879 101,879 94,952 94,952
R2 0.151 0.151 0.218 0.218
NOTE: t-statistics in parentheses* p:0.10, ** p:0.05, *** p:0.01
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TABLE 7: Active vs Passive Equity Issuers :
This table presents results from a regression analysis where the dependent variable is equity issuance.
Firms are sorted into either active or passive issuers. A firm is classified as active if it issue equity
greater than 5% of total assets. All estimations include firm fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at firm-level. Within R2 is reported.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
EquityIssuance EquityIssuance EquityIssuance EquityIssuance
Equity Issuers Active Passive Active Passive
Law -0.103*** -0.000290 -0.103*** -0.000290
(-4.18) (-1.30) (-4.43) (-0.85)
Size -0.0947*** -0.000314*** -0.0947*** -0.000314***
(-31.49) (-6.20) (-16.55) (-2.95)
Profits -0.174*** -0.000258*** -0.174*** -0.000258
(-24.48) (-3.26) (-3.25) (-1.32)
Tangibility -0.467*** 0.000261 -0.467*** 0.000261
(-13.57) (0.74) (-5.98) (0.61)
Cash Flow -0.0575*** -0.0000241* -0.0575** -0.0000241**
(-11.23) (-1.66) (-2.09) (-2.20)
NWC 0.0172*** -0.000347*** 0.0172 -0.000347
(3.78) (-4.51) (0.65) (-1.38)
Investment 0.536*** 0.000251 0.536*** 0.000251
(13.91) (0.42) (3.03) (0.35)
Acquisitions 0.000239 -0.0000255 0.000239 -0.0000255
(0.45) (-1.48) (0.60) (-1.38)
MB 0.00106*** 0.0000291*** 0.00106 0.0000291
(3.65) (3.10) (0.67) (0.48)
Market Cap 0.0520*** 0.000124*** 0.0520*** 0.000124***
(14.50) (3.29) (8.25) (2.91)
Dividend Dummy 0.0788*** -0.0000476 0.0788*** -0.0000476
(8.07) (-0.40) (7.96) (-0.74)
R&D 0.0127 -0.000636*** 0.0127 -0.000636**
(0.67) (-3.51) (0.58) (-2.18)
Constant 0.472*** 0.00149*** 0.472*** 0.00149***
(22.77) (6.64) (14.47) (3.26)
Firm F.E YES YES YES YES
Clustered Std Errors NO NO YES YES
Year F.E NO NO YES YES
N 21,826 28,730 21,826 28,730
R2 0.328 0.00645 0.328 0.00645
NOTE:t-statistics in parentheses * p:0.10, ** p:0.05, *** p:0.01
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TABLE 8: Placebo Tests:
This table presents results from a regression analysis where the dependent variable is market leverage in columns[1-2]. The dependent
variable is equity issuance in columns[3-4]. The dependent variable is debt issuance in models[5-6]. The dependent variable is short-
term debt in column[7] and long-term debt columns[8]. Size is estimated as natural logarithms of total sales. Tangibility, profitability
and MB are described in Table[1]. All estimations include firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at firm-level. Within
R
2 is reported.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Market Lev Market Lev EquityIssuance EquityIssuance Debt Issuance Debt Issuance ST Debt LT Debt
Placebo Law 0.0129** 0.0129 -0.00875 -0.00875 -0.00128 -0.00128 -0.00228 0.00963
(2.34) (1.23) (-1.03) (-1.17) (-0.11) (-0.14) (-0.57) (1.18)
Size 0.0261*** 0.0261*** -0.0550*** -0.0550*** 0.00961*** 0.00961*** 0.00142** 0.0152***
(44.46) (22.60) (-60.65) (-20.27) (7.57) (5.27) (2.30) (15.50)
Tangibility 0.233*** 0.233*** -0.197*** -0.197*** 0.0562*** 0.0562*** 0.0639*** 0.170***
(42.20) (19.54) (-23.07) (-11.34) (4.75) (2.99) (10.04) (16.72)
Profits -0.00969*** -0.00969*** -0.149*** -0.149*** -0.0167*** -0.0167* -0.0157*** -0.00452***
(-9.50) (-2.72) (-95.17) (-4.96) (-8.94) (-1.92) (-5.37) (-2.79)
MB -0.000284*** -0.000284 0.000761*** 0.000761 0.000129*** 0.000129 -0.0000353 -0.0000715
(-9.18) (-1.17) (16.06) (1.16) (2.98) (0.65) (-1.00) (-1.18)
Constant 0.0392*** 0.0392*** 0.405*** 0.405*** 0.00943 0.00943 0.0359*** 0.0477***
(12.69) (6.37) (85.30) (30.11) (1.49) (1.00) (11.16) (9.19)
Firm F.E YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Clustered Std Errors NO YES NO YES NO YES YES YES
Year F.E NO YES NO YES NO YES YES YES
N 103,650 103,650 101,879 101,879 50,591 50,591 103,650 103,650
R2 0.0410 0.0410 0.151 0.151 0.00383 0.00383 0.0134 0.0284
NOTE: t-statistics in parentheses * p:0.10, ** p:0.05, *** p:0.01
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TABLE 9[A]:Accounting for the three states that passed the laws before 2003:
This table presents results from a regression analysis where the dependent variable is market lever-
age in columns[1-2]. The dependent variable is equity issuance in columns[3-4]. The dependent
variable is debt issuance in models[5-6]. Law3states is a dummy variable equals to “1” if a firm
is incorporated in, Texas and Louisiana after 1997 and Alabama after 2002. Size is estimated as
natural logarithms of total sales. Tangibility, profitability and MB are described in Table[1]. All
estimations include firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at firm-level. Within R2 is
reported
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Market Leverage Market Leverage EquityIssuance EquityIssuance DebtIssuance DebtIssuance
Law3states 0.0238*** 0.0238*** -0.0184*** -0.0184** 0.0239*** 0.0239*
(6.16) (2.89) (-3.07) (-2.31) (2.71) (1.76)
Size 0.0257*** 0.0257*** -0.0547*** -0.0547*** 0.00928*** 0.00928***
(43.54) (22.08) (-59.95) (-19.96) (7.29) (5.13)
Tangibility 0.232*** 0.232*** -0.197*** -0.197*** 0.0567*** 0.0567***
(42.21) (19.51) (-23.08) (-11.37) (4.80) (3.03)
Profits -0.00955*** -0.00955*** -0.149*** -0.149*** -0.0166*** -0.0166*
(-9.36) (-2.69) (-95.22) (-4.96) (-8.86) (-1.91)
MB -0.000284*** -0.000284 0.000761*** 0.000761 0.000129*** 0.000129
(-9.19) (-1.17) (16.06) (1.16) (2.98) (0.65)
Constant 0.0395*** 0.0395*** 0.405*** 0.405*** 0.00920 0.00920
(12.79) (6.41) (85.25) (30.03) (1.46) (0.97)
Firm F.E & Year F.E YES YES YES YES YES YES
Clustered Std. Errors NO YES NO YES NO YES
N 103,650 103,650 101,879 101,879 50,591 50,591
R2 0.0998 0.0998 0.247 0.247 0.0109 0.0109
NOTE: t- statistics in parentheses* p:0.10, ** p:0.05, *** p:0.01
51
TABLE 9[B]:Accounting for the three states that passed the laws before 2003:
This table presents results from a regression analysis where firms are sorted into active vs passive issuers. The dependent
variable is equity issuance in columns[1-2]. The dependent variable is debt issuance in models[3-4]. A firm is classified as
“active issuer” if it issue more than 5% of assets in fiscal year- otherwise it is passive. Size is estimated as natural logarithms
of total sales. Tangibility, profitability and MB are described in Table[1]. All estimations include firm fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at firm-level. Within R2 is reported
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EquityIssuance EquityIssuance DebtIssuance DebtIssuance
ISSUERS Active Passive Active Passive
Law3states -0.0984*** 0.0000944 0.0715* -0.00659
(-3.91) (1.05) (1.88) (-1.26)
Size -0.0950*** -0.000323*** 0.0171** -0.00144
(-16.65) (-3.08) (2.42) (-1.01)
Tangibility -0.464*** 0.000271 -0.178*** 0.0217
(-5.95) (0.63) (-3.49) (1.29)
Profits -0.174*** -0.000256 -0.0323** 0.00425
(-3.25) (-1.32) (-2.05) (0.31)
MB 0.00106 0.0000291 0.00930*** -0.00288**
(0.67) (0.48) (4.06) (-1.97)
Cash Flow -0.0575** -0.0000240** 0.00212 0.00505
(-2.09) (-2.19) (1.40) (0.40)
NWC 0.0172 -0.000342 -0.0697** 0.0190
(0.65) (-1.36) (-2.28) (1.26)
Investment 0.537*** 0.000254 0.0677 0.00944
(3.03) (0.36) (0.93) (0.48)
Acquisitions 0.000228 -0.0000260 0.00582 -0.0000948*
(0.57) (-1.41) (0.89) (-1.77)
Market Cap 0.0520*** 0.000123*** -0.0238*** 0.00823***
(8.24) (2.90) (-3.60) (4.24)
Dividend Dummy 0.0791*** -0.0000428 0.0112 0.000253
(7.98) (-0.67) (0.79) (0.13)
R&D 0.0103 -0.000636** 0.0291 0.00448
(0.47) (-2.18) (1.35) (1.16)
Constant 0.473*** 0.00149*** 0.274*** -0.0443***
(14.50) (3.27) (7.44) (-5.58)
Firm F.E & Year YES YES YES YES
Clustered Std Errors YES YES YES YES
N 21,826 28,730 14,269 33,001
R2 0.328 0.00638 0.0668 0.0293
NOTE: t-statistics in parentheses* p:0.10, ** p:0.05, *** p:0.01
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TABLE 10: Accounting for growth rates in Covariates- Balance Sheet Expansion:
This table presents results from a regression analysis where the dependent variable is market leverage
in columns[1-2]. The dependent variable is equity issuance in columns[3-4]. The dependent variable
is debt issuance in models[5-6]. Size is estimated as natural logarithms of total sales. Tangibility,
profitability and MB are described in Table[1]. All estimations include firm fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at firm-level. Within R2 is reported
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mkt lev Mkt Lev ∆Mktlevt,t−1 ∆Mktlevt,t−1 Equity Issuance EquityIssuance
Law 0.0219*** 0.0219*** 0.0163*** 0.0163*** -0.0130*** -0.0130***
(6.13) (2.83) (5.06) (5.63) (-2.80) (-2.60)
∆sizet,t−1xLaw -0.00243 -0.00243 0.000730 0.000730 -0.0237*** -0.0237**
(-0.73) (-0.41) (0.24) (0.17) (-5.49) (-2.20)
∆sizet,t−1 -0.0178*** -0.0178*** 0.0135*** 0.0135*** 0.0159*** 0.0159***
(-16.60) (-11.99) (13.82) (9.03) (11.49) (4.69)
∆tangt,t−1xLaw 0.0457** 0.0457 0.0204 0.0204 0.170*** 0.170***
(2.02) (1.50) (1.00) (0.52) (5.83) (4.46)
∆profitst,t−1xLaw -0.000897 -0.000897 0.00702*** 0.00702 0.0302*** 0.0302*
(-0.41) (-0.47) (2.64) (0.93) (10.74) (1.70)
∆MBt,t−1xLaw -0.000141 -0.000141 0.00109*** 0.00109 0.00126*** 0.00126
(-0.61) (-0.41) (4.54) (1.10) (4.22) (1.21)
∆profitst,t−1 -0.00208*** -0.00208*** -0.0138*** -0.0138*** -0.0227*** -0.0227
(-3.17) (-3.46) (-12.42) (-3.75) (-26.98) (-1.42)
∆tangt,t−1 0.0638*** 0.0638*** 0.209*** 0.209*** -0.260*** -0.260***
(8.18) (6.33) (29.66) (17.08) (-25.78) (-12.39)
∆MBt,t−1 -0.000132*** -0.000132** -0.00229*** -0.00229*** -0.00129*** -0.00129
(-2.77) (-2.09) (-23.17) (-4.23) (-21.20) (-1.50)
Constant 0.222*** 0.222*** 0.00649*** 0.00649*** 0.0701*** 0.0701***
(359.64) (300.98) (11.71) (19.10) (87.71) (98.32)
Firm F.E & Year F.E YES YES YES YES YES YES
Clustered Std. Errors NO YES NO YES NO YES
N 90,149 90,149 90,125 90,125 88,582 88,582
R2 0.00593 0.00593 0.0254 0.0254 0.0175 0.0175
NOTE:t-statistics in parentheses * p:0.10, ** p:0.05, *** p:0.01
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TABLE 11: Equity Issuance: Constrained vs. Unconstrained Firms:
This table presents results from a regression analysis where the dependent variable is equity issuance.
Firm are sorted into low vs high based on level of financial constraints- Whited-Wu Index. Size
is estimated as natural logarithms of total sales. Tangibility, profitability and MB are described
in Table[1]. All estimations include firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at firm-level.
Within R2 is reported
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EquityIssuance EquityIssuance EquityIssuance EquityIssuance
Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained Constrained
Whited-Wu Index LOW HIGH LOW HIGH
Law -0.00940*** -0.0138 -0.00940*** -0.0138
(-3.12) (-1.32) (-2.85) (-1.26)
∆Sizet,t−1xLaw -0.0378*** -0.0338*** -0.0378*** -0.0338*
(-7.91) (-4.22) (-4.04) (-1.86)
∆Sizet,t−1 0.0593*** 0.0126*** 0.0593*** 0.0126**
(36.15) (5.06) (11.55) (2.48)
∆Profitst,t−1xLaw 0.00423 0.0308*** 0.00423 0.0308*
(0.40) (7.70) (0.25) (1.68)
∆Profitst,t−1 -0.0207*** -0.0224*** -0.0207 -0.0224
(-4.77) (-18.34) (-1.45) (-1.37)
∆Tangt,t−1xLaw 0.169*** 0.199*** 0.169*** 0.199***
(7.27) (3.77) (5.10) (3.27)
∆Tangt,t−1 -0.259*** -0.280*** -0.259*** -0.280***
(-30.20) (-16.01) (-16.40) (-9.33)
∆MBt,t−1xLaw 0.000869 0.00130*** 0.000869 0.00130
(0.67) (3.08) (0.51) (1.21)
∆MBt,t−1 -0.00101*** -0.00128*** -0.00101* -0.00128
(-5.23) (-14.62) (-1.88) (-1.44)
Constant 0.0263*** 0.103*** 0.0263*** 0.103***
(39.99) (64.71) (19.32) (81.39)
Firm F.E YES YES YES YES
Clustered Std. Errors NO NO YES YES
Year F.E NO NO YES YES
N 45,262 43,320 45,262 43,320
Rs 0.0594 0.0162 0.0594 0.0162
NOTE: t-statistics in parentheses * p:0.10, ** p:0.05, *** p:0.01
54
TABLE 12: Equity Repurchases:
This table presents results from a regression analysis where the dependent variable is equity repurchase. Equity repurchase is
estimated as purchase of common stock. Size is estimated as natural logarithms of total sales. Tangibility, profitability and
MB are described in Table[1]. Columns[3-6] use growth rates in covariates as independent variables. All estimation includes
firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at firm-level. Within R2 is reported
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EquityRep EquityRep EquityRep EquityRep EquityRep EquityRep
Law 0.00515*** 0.00515*** 0.00883*** 0.00883*** 0.00870*** 0.00870***
(4.37) (3.28) (7.23) (5.96) (7.11) (5.82)
Size 0.00273*** 0.00273***
(12.73) (9.17)
Tangibility -0.00260 -0.00260
(-1.33) (-1.11)
Profits 0.000279 0.000279
(0.75) (0.70)
MB 0.00000969 0.00000969
(0.92) (1.02)
∆sizet,t−1 -0.00302*** -0.00302*** -0.00321*** -0.00321***
(-8.35) (-7.48) (-8.38) (-7.49)
∆Profitt,t−1 0.000150 0.000150 0.000172 0.000172*
(0.68) (1.62) (0.77) (1.81)
∆Tangt,t−1 0.0302*** 0.0302*** 0.0293*** 0.0293***
(11.88) (10.08) (10.84) (9.67)
∆MBt,t−1 0.00000592 0.00000592 0.00000766 0.00000766
(0.37) (0.90) (0.47) (1.16)
∆sizet,t−1xLaw 0.00176 0.00176
(1.50) (1.38)
∆Tangt,t−1xLaw 0.00712 0.00712
(0.90) (0.67)
∆profitt,t−1xLaw -0.000332 -0.000332
(-0.46) (-0.66)
∆MBt,t−1xLaw -0.0000416 -0.0000416
(-0.54) (-0.77)
Constant 0.00237** 0.00237 0.0148*** 0.0148*** 0.0148*** 0.0148***
(2.10) (1.51) (69.99) (102.35) (69.98) (101.21)
Firm F.E & Year F.E YES YES YES YES YES YES
Clustered Std. Errors NO YES NO YES NO YES
N 95,246 95,246 82,998 82,998 82,998 82,998
R2 0.00255 0.00255 0.00355 0.00355 0.00360 0.00360
NOTE: t-statistics in parentheses * p:0.10, ** p:0.05, *** p:0.01
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TABLE 13: Financial Constraints and Leverage :
This table presents results from a regression analysis where the dependent variable is market leverage in columns[1-2]. The
dependent variable is long-term debt in columns[3-4]. The dependent variable is short-term debt in models[5-6]. Size is
estimated as natural logarithms of total sales. Tangibility, profitability and MB are described in Table[1]. All estimations
include firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at firm-level. Within R2 is reported
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Market Leverage Market Leverage LT Debt LT Debt ST Debt ST Debt
TABLE 13: Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained Constrained
Whited-Wu Index LOW HIGH LOW HIGH LOW HIGH
Law -0.00687 0.0377*** -0.00847 0.0117 -0.00539** -0.00286
(-1.08) (4.19) (-1.24) (1.59) (-2.12) (-0.53)
Size 0.129*** 0.0509*** 0.0441*** 0.0128*** 0.00811*** 0.00954***
(42.63) (29.69) (19.20) (9.88) (6.18) (9.73)
Tangibility 0.0796*** 0.173*** 0.136*** 0.185*** 0.00796 0.0488***
(4.44) (12.10) (7.77) (15.39) (1.09) (5.01)
MB 0.0116*** 0.000929*** 0.00177*** -0.0000807 0.000706** 0.000104
(13.15) (3.81) (3.49) (-0.81) (2.46) (0.98)
Profits -0.181*** 0.0172*** -0.172*** 0.00187 0.0653* 0.00848
(-6.05) (4.72) (-12.00) (0.69) (1.84) (1.39)
Cash Flow -0.0421** -0.00708*** 0.0145 -0.00493** -0.0666** -0.00697
(-1.96) (-2.94) (1.61) (-2.35) (-2.10) (-1.35)
NWC -0.0131 -0.0112* 0.0664*** 0.0101** -0.112*** -0.0431*
(-0.66) (-1.92) (3.52) (2.08) (-3.00) (-1.88)
Capx -0.132*** -0.122*** -0.0590*** -0.0269** -0.00248 -0.0263
(-6.99) (-3.32) (-2.89) (-2.05) (-0.25) (-1.26)
Acquisitions 0.0411*** 0.000641*** 0.0372*** 0.000130 0.000881 -0.0000523
(6.97) (3.03) (4.86) (0.69) (0.77) (-0.70)
Market Cap -0.126*** -0.0894*** -0.0275*** -0.00638*** -0.0150*** -0.0213***
(-42.39) (-51.91) (-13.87) (-5.44) (-12.25) (-16.00)
Dividend Dummy -0.00221 -0.00281 -0.00666** -0.00293 0.000826 0.000961
(-0.78) (-0.83) (-2.24) (-0.98) (0.71) (0.43)
R&D 0.0000463 -0.00608 -0.00440 -0.000897 -0.00419 -0.00812*
(0.01) (-0.95) (-0.65) (-0.19) (-1.56) (-1.90)
Constant 0.178*** 0.335*** 0.0619*** 0.0754*** 0.0859*** 0.113***
(14.33) (43.13) (5.21) (11.80) (12.51) (19.26)
Firm F.E & Year F.E YES YES YES YES YES YES
Clustered Std Errors YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 46,084 50,358 46,084 50,358 46,084 50,358
R2 0.462 0.331 0.0865 0.0348 0.149 0.108
NOTE: t-statistics in parentheses * p:0.10, ** p:0.05, *** p:0.01
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TABLE 14: Accounting for the Effects of the 2008 Financial Crisis:
This table presents results from a regression analysis where the dependent variable is market leverage in columns[1-2]. The
dependent variable is equity issuance in columns[3-4]. The dependent variable is debt issuance in models[5-6]. Size is estimated
as natural logarithms of total sales. Tangibility, profitability and MB are described in Table[1].“After” is a dummy equals 1
after the 2008 financial crisis and zero otherwise. All estimation includes firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at
firm-level. Within R2 is reported. NOTE: t-statistics in parentheses * p:0.10, ** p:0.05, *** p:0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Market Leverage Market Leverage Equity Issuance Equity Issuance Debt Issuance Debt Issuance
Law 0.0285*** 0.0285*** -0.0242*** -0.0242*** 0.0182** 0.0182
(10.00) (4.48) (-4.66) (-3.93) (2.32) (1.60)
After 0.00698*** 0.00698*** -0.0149*** -0.0149*** 0.00591* 0.00591
(5.14) (2.69) (-6.03) (-4.04) (1.76) (0.92)
Size 0.0690*** 0.0690*** -0.0759*** -0.0759*** 0.0141*** 0.0141***
(119.90) (41.84) (-72.61) (-22.72) (9.46) (3.64)
Tangibility 0.153*** 0.153*** -0.187*** -0.187*** 0.0156 0.0156
(30.26) (12.00) (-20.35) (-6.32) (1.18) (0.68)
Profits 0.00341*** 0.00341 -0.135*** -0.135*** -0.0103*** -0.0103
(3.25) (1.19) (-71.06) (-3.64) (-4.61) (-1.60)
MB 0.00125*** 0.00125*** 0.00398*** 0.00398** 0.00284*** 0.00284
(15.88) (3.62) (27.89) (2.24) (14.25) (1.07)
Cash Flow -0.000661* -0.000661 -0.00555*** -0.00555* 0.00418*** 0.00418**
(-1.83) (-1.00) (-8.52) (-1.85) (5.92) (2.13)
NWC -0.0110*** -0.0110 -0.00599*** -0.00599 -0.00292 -0.00292
(-10.57) (-1.52) (-3.20) (-0.46) (-0.76) (-0.20)
CAPX -0.157*** -0.157*** 0.226*** 0.226* 0.164*** 0.164***
(-21.14) (-4.88) (16.84) (1.75) (9.23) (2.97)
Acquisitions 0.00111*** 0.00111*** -0.0000250 -0.0000250 0.000417* 0.000417
(7.85) (2.78) (-0.10) (-0.06) (1.66) (0.96)
Market Cap -0.0962*** -0.0962*** 0.0518*** 0.0518*** -0.00696*** -0.00696
(-195.59) (-66.66) (57.97) (16.79) (-5.40) (-1.56)
Dividend Dummy -0.00113 -0.00113 0.0708*** 0.0708*** 0.00399 0.00399
(-0.78) (-0.46) (27.05) (20.25) (1.05) (0.83)
R&D -0.000845 -0.000845 0.0193*** 0.0193*** 0.0194*** 0.0194**
(-0.33) (-0.17) (4.17) (2.65) (3.09) (1.96)
Constant 0.314*** 0.314*** 0.203*** 0.203*** -0.000375 -0.000375
(98.18) (42.13) (34.90) (14.22) (-0.05) (-0.03)
Firm F.E & Year F.E YES YES YES YES YES YES
Clustered Std Errors NO YES NO YES NO YES
N 96,442 96,442 94,952 94,952 47,270 47,270
R2 0.361 0.361 0.218 0.218 0.0124 0.0124
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TABLE 15[A]: Accounting for the Effects of the Internal Capital:
This table presents results from a regression analysis where the dependent variable is market leverage in columns[1-2]. The
dependent variable is equity issuance in columns[3-4]. The dependent variable is debt issuance in models[5-6]. Size is estimated
as natural logarithms of total sales. Tangibility, profitability and MB are described in Table[1]. All estimation includes firm
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at firm-level. Within R2 is reported
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Market Lev Market Lev EquityIssuance EquityIssuance Debt Issuance Debt Issuance
Law 0.0302*** 0.0302*** -0.0289*** -0.0289*** 0.0195** 0.0195*
(10.67) (4.75) (-5.68) (-4.54) (2.49) (1.72)
Cash -0.0884*** -0.0884*** 0.357*** 0.357*** -0.103*** -0.103***
(-23.39) (-13.52) (52.72) (22.25) (-11.38) (-8.81)
Size 0.0655*** 0.0655*** -0.0601*** -0.0601*** 0.00953*** 0.00953**
(111.80) (39.80) (-57.25) (-17.58) (6.30) (2.36)
Tangibility 0.111*** 0.111*** -0.0234** -0.0234 -0.0382*** -0.0382*
(21.07) (8.33) (-2.47) (-0.80) (-2.74) (-1.67)
Profits 0.00442*** 0.00442 -0.139*** -0.139*** -0.00896*** -0.00896
(4.22) (1.53) (-74.62) (-3.69) (-4.00) (-1.40)
MB 0.00126*** 0.00126*** 0.00394*** 0.00394** 0.00282*** 0.00282
(15.98) (3.63) (28.13) (2.22) (14.16) (1.06)
Cash Flow -0.000679* -0.000679 -0.00546*** -0.00546* 0.00407*** 0.00407**
(-1.89) (-1.02) (-8.53) (-1.80) (5.77) (2.08)
NWC -0.0122*** -0.0122 -0.00127 -0.00127 -0.00599 -0.00599
(-11.79) (-1.59) (-0.69) (-0.10) (-1.56) (-0.41)
Capx -0.161*** -0.161*** 0.241*** 0.241* 0.159*** 0.159***
(-21.82) (-4.94) (18.22) (1.89) (8.94) (2.95)
Acquisitions 0.00106*** 0.00106*** 0.000200 0.000200 0.000370 0.000370
(7.48) (2.84) (0.79) (0.62) (1.48) (0.88)
Market Cap -0.0939*** -0.0939*** 0.0425*** 0.0425*** -0.00395*** -0.00395
(-187.84) (-64.66) (47.31) (14.09) (-3.01) (-0.87)
Dividend Dummy -0.000595 -0.000595 0.0688*** 0.0688*** 0.00450 0.00450
(-0.41) (-0.24) (26.70) (19.65) (1.18) (0.93)
R&D 0.000504 0.000504 0.0143*** 0.0143* 0.0198*** 0.0198**
(0.20) (0.10) (3.14) (1.89) (3.17) (2.02)
Constant 0.349*** 0.349*** 0.0608*** 0.0608*** 0.0417*** 0.0417***
(98.80) (43.05) (9.61) (3.55) (4.68) (3.17)
Firm F.E & Year F.E YES YES YES YES YES YES
Clustered Std Errors NO YES NO YES NO YES
N 96,442 96,442 94,952 94,952 47,270 47,270
R2 0.365 0.365 0.243 0.243 0.0156 0.0156
NOTE: t-statistics in parentheses: * p:0.10, ** p:0.05, *** p:0.01
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TABLE 15[B]: Accounting for the Effects of the Internal Capital:This table presents results from a regression analysis where the
dependent variable is market leverage in columns[1-4]. The dependent variable is debt issuance in columns[5-8]. Size is estimated as natural logarithms of total sales.
Tangibility, profitability and MB are described in Table[1]. All estimations include firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at firm-level. Within R2 is reported
Table 15B (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Market Lev Market Lev Market Lev Market Lev Debt Issuance Debt Issuance Debt Issuance Debt Issuance
Law 0.0302*** 0.0302*** 0.0398*** 0.0398*** 0.0195** 0.0195* 0.0257*** 0.0257*
(10.67) (10.67) (5.77) (12.47) (2.49) (1.72) (2.89) (1.76)
LawxCash -0.0737*** -0.0737*** -0.0393 -0.0393
(-2.95) (-6.52) (-1.48) (-1.11)
Cash -0.0884*** -0.0884*** -0.0836*** -0.0836*** -0.103*** -0.103*** -0.101*** -0.101***
(-23.39) (-23.39) (-12.35) (-21.74) (-11.38) (-8.81) (-10.88) (-8.32)
Size 0.0655*** 0.0655*** 0.0654*** 0.0654*** 0.00953*** 0.00953** 0.00942*** 0.00942**
(111.80) (111.80) (39.80) (111.66) (6.30) (2.36) (6.22) (2.35)
Tangibility 0.111*** 0.111*** 0.110*** 0.110*** -0.0382*** -0.0382* -0.0387*** -0.0387*
(21.07) (21.07) (8.26) (20.88) (-2.74) (-1.67) (-2.78) (-1.69)
Profits 0.00442*** 0.00442*** 0.00445 0.00445*** -0.00896*** -0.00896 -0.00891*** -0.00891
(4.22) (4.22) (1.55) (4.25) (-4.00) (-1.40) (-3.98) (-1.40)
MB 0.00126*** 0.00126*** 0.00126*** 0.00126*** 0.00282*** 0.00282 0.00282*** 0.00282
(15.98) (15.98) (3.63) (15.97) (14.16) (1.06) (14.16) (1.06)
Cash Flow -0.000679* -0.000679* -0.000664 -0.000664* 0.00407*** 0.00407** 0.00408*** 0.00408**
(-1.89) (-1.89) (-1.00) (-1.85) (5.77) (2.08) (5.78) (2.08)
NWC -0.0122*** -0.0122*** -0.0123 -0.0123*** -0.00599 -0.00599 -0.00603 -0.00603
(-11.79) (-11.79) (-1.60) (-11.87) (-1.56) (-0.41) (-1.57) (-0.41)
Capx -0.161*** -0.161*** -0.161*** -0.161*** 0.159*** 0.159*** 0.159*** 0.159***
(-21.82) (-21.82) (-4.92) (-21.85) (8.94) (2.95) (8.93) (2.96)
Acquisitions 0.00106*** 0.00106*** 0.00106*** 0.00106*** 0.000370 0.000370 0.000371 0.000371
(7.48) (7.48) (2.83) (7.50) (1.48) (0.88) (1.48) (0.88)
Market Cap -0.0939*** -0.0939*** -0.0940*** -0.0940*** -0.00395*** -0.00395 -0.00395*** -0.00395
(-187.84) (-187.84) (-64.52) (-187.95) (-3.01) (-0.87) (-3.01) (-0.87)
Dividend Dummy -0.000595 -0.000595 -0.000517 -0.000517 0.00450 0.00450 0.00458 0.00458
(-0.41) (-0.41) (-0.21) (-0.36) (1.18) (0.93) (1.20) (0.95)
R&D 0.000504 0.000504 0.000494 0.000494 0.0198*** 0.0198** 0.0198*** 0.0198**
(0.20) (0.20) (0.10) (0.19) (3.17) (2.02) (3.16) (2.01)
Constant 0.349*** 0.349*** 0.349*** 0.349*** 0.0417*** 0.0417*** 0.0418*** 0.0418***
(98.80) (98.80) (43.09) (98.81) (4.68) (3.17) (4.70) (3.18)
Firm F.E & Year F.E YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Clustered Std Erros NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
N 96,442 96,442 96,442 96,442 47,270 47,270 47,270 47,270
R2 0.365 0.365 0.365 0.365 0.0156 0.0156 0.0157 0.0157
NOTE: t-statistics in parentheses * p:0.10, ** p:0.05, *** p:0.01
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